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1. TASK MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES 
This interim technical report summarizes the FY17 accomplishments for Research Task RT-176 – 
Verification and Validation  (V&V) of System Behavior Specifications. 
The NAVAIR workforce has a need for Model Centric Systems Engineering (MCSE) methods, processes 
and tools (MPTs) capable of assessing the goodness of system behavior specifications and other 
requirements earlier in the lifecycle of a system.  In particular, the NAVAIR Systems Engineering 
Transformation (SET) initiative aims to leverage and extend existing research in the area of MPTs for 
performing early V&V of requirements and architecture models managed within its organization, and to 
educate its workforce in the use of automated tools for conducting early and continuous V&V across the 
entire lifecycle. Several Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system models have been developed for use as 
a case study to test new and improved MPTs that have been developed as a result of this task.  These 
MPTs are expected to apply to other systems in many domains throughout DOD and other government 
agencies. 
 
The objectives of this work are aligned to NAVAIR SET tasks as follows: 
 
Model-based V&V Demo (Task Lead: Kristin Giammarco)  
• Formalize UAV behavior specifications into MBSE architecture tool(s) 
– using Monterey Phoenix for comprehensive use case scenario generation 
– Core Value Proposition: Manual drawing of a limited set of use cases is replaced with 
automatic and comprehensive scenario generation, enabling humans to spend more time on 
requirements analysis and V&V tasks that cannot be automated. Correction of errors in 
system behavior is then done much earlier. 
• Demonstrate use of the UAV behavior model for early V&V analysis of requirements 
– using MP to expose positive and negative system behaviors permitted by the design 
– Core Value Proposition: Requirements gaps are identified and fixed early (before 
contracting), through inspection of a comprehensive set of use case scenarios.  
• Formalize patterns of common design flaws or other model properties 
– using MP event grammar to store system behavior templates 
– Core Value Propositions: Save money by eliminating error-prone, labor-intensive, and 
expensive manual checking, and provide specification for testing contracted models for 
presence or absence of wanted and unwanted system behaviors discovered during early 
model-based V&V. 
 
Training Content Development and Delivery (Task Lead: Ron Carlson) 
• Work on this task is planned in FY18. 
 
Coaching & Mentoring (Task Lead: Kristin Giammarco) 
• Create a catalog of typical architecture model views for behavior containing good practices 
(patterns*), poor practices (anti-patterns†), and pattern / anti-pattern examples. 
• Provide ongoing mentoring and coaching support as needed on pilot projects. 
                                                   
* Tool-agnostic patterns with style guidance for certain critical and useful model views will be incorporated. 
 
† Discovered practices that should be avoided are often called anti-patterns since they illustrate examples contrary to good practice. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
Verification and validation (V&V) are distinct processes used for ensuring that a system meets its 
requirements and specifications, and satisfies the user’s need. System verification is “the confirmation, 
through the provision of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled” (SEBoK 
authors, 2016). Verification is performed throughout a system’s lifecycle and involves performing tests 
to ensure the system continues to meet the requirements and specification as the system develops. 
System validation is the procedure used to ensure compliance of any system element with its intended 
purpose (SEBoK authors, 2016). Modeling and simulation are frequently used to support V&V activities 
throughout a system’s lifecycle.  
 
Model V&V should be conducted for each use of the model, as the model may be valid for one set of 
conditions but invalid for another (Sargent, 2015). Model verification ensures the implementation of the 
conceptual model is logically sound, and that the conceptual model is programmed accurately into the 
computer model (Sargent, 2015). Two recognized verification approaches are model checking and 
theorem proving (Clarke et. al, 1996). Model validation confirms the model generates outputs that 
accurately reflect the model’s purpose.  Model V&V should be performed each time the model is 
modified.  Model validation can be accomplished several different ways: independent V&V where a 
third party decides whether the model is valid (typically the most costly), validation by the model 
development team using test data, or by the user. 
 
The fundamental purpose of V&V is usually to ascertain whether or not a modeled system will have the 
expected behavior when it is in operation, and identify any unexpected or unwanted behaviors early so 
that they can be dealt with in a controlled and least costly setting (Auguston et. al, 2015).  Current 
industry standards for modeling system behavior include the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) 
viewpoints for sequence, activity, use case and state machine diagrams; system dynamics (SD) models 
depicting control and feedback in system processes; and agent-based models (ABM) that describe agent 
behaviors and interactions between agents and with the environment. The following paragraph goes 
into more depth on each approach and introduces Monterey Phoenix (MP), a new approach and tool for 
specifying system behavior. 
 
SysML use case, sequence, activity and state transition diagrams provide different views on a system’s 
behavior, and some automated tools enable discrete event simulation of SysML activity diagrams.  A 
current challenge with these diagrams is the difficulty in representing all possible behaviors completely, 
concisely and legibly enough for inspection during V&V (Auguston et. al, 2015).  SD models are 
mathematically rigorous; yet abstract enough for a wide variety of system applications.  However, SD 
models are best used for closed-loop systems in which component dependencies must be considered at 
the global level (Borshchev & Filippov, 2004). MP‡ augments a typical ABM approach by adding 
standardization for defining agents and events using formalized event grammar and structured syntax 
(Ruppel, 2016). MP also has a demonstrated ability to expose incorrect, hazardous, or otherwise 
undesirable behaviors in processes and system designs so that these unwanted behaviors can be 
removed or mitigated before they manifest in an actual system (Bryant, 2016; Nelson, 2015; Pilcher, 
2015; Revill, 2016).  MP addresses the SysML diagram challenges by advocating a separate diagram of 
behavior for each agent, whose events are interrelated to other events on other diagrams through event 
sharing and coordination (Giammarco & Auguston, 2013).  This model structure allows the generation of 
                                                   
‡ MP is a system architecture and workflow behavior modeling language and tool developed at NPS. The government-owned MP 
Analyzer tool is hosted publicly at http://firebird.nps.edu, has no licensing fees, and requires no installation. 
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a set of sequence diagrams, each describing one possible outcome of behavior at the System of Systems 
(SoS) level, which is useful content for inspection during V&V activities (Auguston, 2016).   
 
In computer science and software engineering, formal methods (Clarke et. al, 1996; Guttag & Horning, 
2012; Hoare, 1985; Jones, 1990; Rushby, 1993; Spivey, 1988) are mathematically grounded techniques 
including logic, semantics, and formal languages (Ruppel, 2016). Some use the term lightweight to 
characterize an approach used to analyze part of the specification document without re-baselining the 
entire specification, and the term heavyweight to describe a deeper, complete application of the 
methodology (Easterbrook et. al, 1998) (Agerholm and Larsen, 1998) (Woodcock et. al, 2009).  
Woodcock et al. (2009) propose that the use of formal methods looks to be increasing, but is mainly 
confined to critical systems development. MP’s applicability as a lightweight formal method at various 
levels of abstraction and ability to be used by non-technical stakeholders (Auguston et. al, 2015; Bryant, 
2016) is expected to promote a more widespread use of formal methods in system behavior V&V, 
exposure of more design flaws earlier (Auguston et. al, 2015; Giammarco & Auguston, 2013), and a new 
capability to identify and detect patterns (Giammarco, 2014; Rodano & Giammarco, 2013) of good or 
bad behaviors in architecture models so that patterns discovered on one project may benefit other 
projects. 
3. TECHNICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
This section of the technical report summarizes the FY17 accomplishments by SET task.  Bi-monthly 
status reports have been provided to communicate the progress towards each task objective.  To 
maximize reuse and dissemination of the FY17 deliverables, they are organized into the following 
appendices to this report so that they can be separated into standalone content and shared with the 
interested parties. 
 Appendix A: List of Publications and Invited Talks Resulted 
 Appendix B: References Cited 
 Appendix C: Collaborator Courses that Integrate or Contribute Research Results 
 Appendix D: Monterey Phoenix Overview 
 Appendix E: Preliminary Catalog of Reusable Architecture Patterns 
 Appendix F: Instructions for Downloading UAV Models 
 Appendix G: Model Based V&V (MCSE MPT) Demonstration 
Spanning across all SET tasks has been the ongoing development and maintenance of the Monterey 
Phoenix modeling language and tool (Appendix D), as well as documentation and dissemination of the 
research (Appendix A).  Progress on the evolution of MP has been reported in status updates throughout 
the year.  At this point in time, MP version 3 is complete and is awaiting graphical user interface (GUI) 
updates necessary to access the new features on the MP-Firebird server at firebird.nps.edu.  In the last 
month of FY17, the team arrived at a potential solution to the last outstanding project risk pertaining to 
the MP tool deployment and transition.  The solution involves bringing the GUI development under 
project control by applying project resources to the GUI development, which is now possible with the 
availability of a faculty research associate with the needed skillset.  A transition of the MP software from 
cloud-based Firebird to a standalone installation will begin as soon as practical in FY18. 
The code for MP version 3 is complete with the following essential new language features: 
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o User-defined relations and relational expressions (transitive closure and reverse) in 
navigation expressions; 
o $$scope meta-symbol; 
o asynchronous coordination operation; 
o event reshuffling options; 
o SHARE clause, it is possible to express SHARE ALL via COORDINATE and SHARE clause using 
reshuffling to control the ordering of event sharing; 
o MAY_OVERLAP predicate; 
o $$ANY generic event type; 
o New examples in the pre-loaded set. 
 
The code for MP version 4 is under development, adding event attributes and customizable architecture 
views. 
 
Whereas Appendix A exclusively contains works that resulted from this research effort, Appendix B 
contains a broader set of prior and related work cited throughout this report and its appendices.  
Appendix C contains a description of the courses that integrated and contributed to this research; many 
NPS Master’s students did project work utilizing the research materials, the best of which was leveraged 
back into the project.  Appendix D contains an overview of MP that serves as an initial tutorial for the 
MP user community.   The purpose of Appendix D is to teach the NAVAIR workforce and others the 
fundamental concepts of MP.  Appendix E provides a preliminary catalog of reusable architecture 
patterns to keep in mind throughout a modeling effort.  Appendix F provides instructions for 
downloading the MP models of the UAV developed thus far.  Finally, building on the fundamental ideas 
in Appendices D and E, Appendix G teaches how to verify and validate system behavior specifications 
using the Government-Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) MP-Firebird tool.  
 
The following subsections outline the mission, goals, and objectives of each SET task in scope of this RT, 
along with the appendices in which the related FY17 deliverables are found. 
3.1.  MODEL-BASED V&V DEMO 
The mission of this SET task is to demonstrate how to conduct early and continuous V&V of 
requirements through behavior modeling & simulation. 
 
The goal is to develop a behavior model for a UAV employed in an Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) mission. 
 
The objectives are to: 
1. Formalize UAV behavior specifications into MBSE architecture tool(s).  
 Delivered in Appendix F, Appendix G 
2. Demonstrate use of the UAV behavior model for early V&V analysis of requirements.  
 Delivered in Appendix F, Appendix G 
3. Formalize patterns of common design flaws or other model properties 
 Delivered in Appendix E 
3.2.  TRAINING CONTENT DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY  
By request of the sponsor, this task will be initiated in and reported on in FY18.    
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3.3.  COACHING & MENTORING  
Work on this task began in July 2017 and is planned for continuation into FY18.  A plan for a coaching 
and mentoring task was initiated to develop a MBSE best practices catalog focused on behavior 
modeling practices.  
 
The mission of this task is to equip model-developing members of the workforce with good MBSE skills 
and practices for behavior modeling. 
 
The goals of this task are to realize the claimed benefits of MBSE in behavior modeling practice, and to 
sustain effective MBSE implementation through ongoing mentoring and coaching. 
 
The objectives of this task are to collect examples of good and poor behavior modeling practices, 
develop and teach patterns of good and poor practices, and provide ongoing coaching & mentoring for 
pilot teams. 
 
Some preliminary anti-patterns (poor modeling practices) are cataloged in Appendix E. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND WAY AHEAD 
 
The first year of RT-176 resulted in multiple advancements and contributions to the systems modeling 
community.  Appendix A lists numerous papers and invited talks that were produced as a result of RT-
176.  The papers disseminate the major MCSE MPTs created during year 1.  Appendix B organizes all 
other references cited throughout this report.  Appendix C provides a brief description of graduate-level 
courses that have integrated, tested or contributed to the MCSE MPTs developed for this research task.  
Appendix D contains a general overview of the Monterey Phoenix (MP) approach used throughout this 
research task.  Appendix E provides a preliminary catalog of reusable architecture patterns that were 
created during the research task.  Appendix F provides download instructions for the UAV models 
developed for this research effort, and Appendix G demonstrates the application of MPTs for 
verification and validation of requirements with MP, drawing on the UAV models for examples.  
 
The FY17 deliverables discussed in the status reports are mapped to the report appendices in the table 
below.  
 
Table 4.1 FY17 Deliverables 
 
End of Year Deliverable A013 Technical Report Section  
Conference papers, presentations, Master’s theses, and 
textbook chapters 
Appendix A 
A013 Interim Technical Report containing: 
 Findings, recommendations 
 
 5. Conclusions and Way Ahead 
 Instructions for applying demonstrated MCSE MPTs 
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End of Year Deliverable A013 Technical Report Section  
 Preliminary catalog of discovered architecture 
patterns that are reusable on other NAVAIR systems 
that use MCSE MPTs 
Appendix E 
MP models of UAVs with corresponding exhaustive set of use 
case variants  
Appendix F 
Initial presentation and training materials for the NAVAIR 
workforce  
Appendix D, Appendix G 
 
4.1.  FINDINGS 
This subsection summarizes research findings supported by the body of work in the report appendices.  
4.1.1.  FIVE KEY CONCEPTS SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEM AND SOS BEHAVIOR MODELS  
Behavior modeling and simulation ought to be conducted prior to discrete-event, agent-based, dynamic, 
or hybrid simulation so that the developer starts with a logical and appropriately refined description of 
the system.  This behavior description naturally leads to the system architecture definition, activity and 
sequence diagrams, interfaces, and insight to modular building blocks for system design and 
implementation.  Five key system of systems modeling concepts to guide this process were distilled 
from the modeling efforts: Separate behaviors and interactions, model system behaviors and 
environment behaviors, formalize models for automatic execution, properly allocate each task to a 
human or to a machine, and use abstraction and refinement to manage large models.  See Appendix A 
research products [6] and [13] for more about these principles. 
4.1.2.  MODEL DEVELOPERS CAN EXPOSE BOTH WANTED AND UNWANTED BEHAVIORS WITHOUT SPECIALIZED 
SKILLS 
Both wanted and unwanted behaviors can be discovered early in system models using the Monterey 
Phoenix approach and language.  Execution of the model exposes both desirable and undesirable 
interactions that may not have been expected by the developer.  A six-step methodology was proposed 
to make this new capability available to the NAVAIR workforce and others who are building their 
organization practice of MBSE.  Program managers should expect to see more invalid behaviors in their 
systems being exposed earlier in design (at the architecture level) with MP as part of their tool suite. 
Students ranging from high school to graduate-level education were able to learn MP quickly and then 
use it to expose unspecified and potentially invalid behaviors on systems with which they were familiar, 
suggesting that this lightweight formal method approach for behavior model V&V is relatively user 
friendly and easy to learn. 
4.1.3.  MODEL DEVELOPERS CAN GENERATE ALL USE CASE SCENARIOS AUTOMATICALLY UP TO A SCOPE LIMIT 
MP automatically generates a comprehensive set of use case scenarios.  Every possible system or SoS-
level behavior is generated for verification, validation, and documentation of counterexamples.  A major 
advancement in model-based verification is assertion checking with MP, which allows one to state 
requirements for behaviors that must be avoided, and prove that they are absent from the design up to 
a specified scope limit.  The scope limit is the maximum number of iterations for loops in the behavior 
model.  We expect most V&V issues to be exposed in our behavior models at a small scope of about 3 
given Jackson’s (2006) Small Scope Hypothesis, further discussed in Appendix D.  A major advancement 
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to model-based validation is counterexample documentation, which may be used to demonstrate (e.g., 
to program leadership, or to new workforce members) why a certain requirement is needed – i.e., what 
scenarios could emerge if the requirement is relaxed removed. A main impact of MP on model-based 
V&V is its ability to make many more descriptions of emergent behaviors available to decision makers 
earlier in the system’s design, so that they may be carefully planned for or removed in the design rather 
than haphazardly dealt with after they emerge in the actual system. Appendices D-G and research 
product [5] provide a starting guide for new MP modelers who seek to repeat the approach on their 
system or SoS of interest. 
4.1.4.  ALL BEHAVIORS NOT EXPLICITLY SUPPRESSED WILL EVENTUALLY EMERGE  
In the course of this research, it became clear that MP could be used to steer the behaviors emerging 
from SoS models by relaxing or restricting control over component or system interactions.  We view 
each system as having its own behaviors, all of which will eventually manifest unless we deliberately 
suppress those behaviors.  We coax these behaviors out in simulation by adding constraints one at a 
time within and among comprehensive system models. In design, we consider positive emergence to be 
the acceptable behaviors and interactions that remain after the negative emergence has been 
thoroughly exposed and pruned.  
MP-Firebird provides the developer with an interactive simulation environment to test whether 
constraints and coordination of events have the desired effects.  Using assertions to propose a query 
and then marking the associated traces enables the user to quickly identify the model response. Within 
the scope of execution, all possible permutations of model output are derived and analyzed within the 
execution environment.  This provides a level of assurance that an architecture that complies with the 
model definition and constraints will have known and bounded results. Constraint types include logical 
limitations, simplification decisions, and design requirements.  Analysis of the model is necessary to 
avoid overly-constraining the model.  An overly-constrained model could eliminate essential outcomes 
or the failure to identify emergent properties of the system. 
4.1.5.  MODEL DEVELOPERS CAN DETECT, CLASSIFY, PREDICT AND CONTROL EMERGENT BEHAVIORS WITH MP 
Over the past year, MP has been used to detect, classify, predict and control emergent behaviors of SoS 
early in design, during modeling and simulation.  MP automatically detected all possible combinations of 
system behaviors and interactions permitted by the model.  During inspection, the emergent behaviors 
were classified as favorable or unfavorable, simple, weak, strong, and positive or negative.  The human 
inspector used each generated scenario as a canvas for predicting future states of emergence, which 
influenced classification.  The negative emergent behaviors were controlled through modification of the 
individual behavior models or relaxation / restriction of interaction constraints. In making this discovery, 
we found a need to refine and formalize the emergent behavior classification taxonomy, which the 
example models generated over the past year might be used to help shape.  The essential features of 
MP enabling control of emergent behaviors are: ability to formalize interactions within the system and 
between the system and its environment at an appropriate level of abstraction, automated generation 
of exhaustive sets of scenarios within a given scope, and tools for the analysis of generated scenarios 
supporting assertion checking, event trace visualization and annotation. See Appendix A research 
product [12] for the research behind this finding. 
4.1.6.  PROBABILITIES FOR BEHAVIOR OUTCOMES CAN BE CALCULATED 
The MP execution environment supports analysis of the results including the fundamental structure of a 
Bayesian belief network, facilitating a probability calculation of each possible outcome.  During the 
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development of the system architecture, it may not be possible to avoid all undesirable outcomes, 
however the resulting system provides insight on ways to limit the effects of undesirable events. See 
Appendix A research products [9] and [13] for the research behind this finding. 
4.1.7.  TEMPLATES FOR BEHAVIOR PATTERNS CAN BE DERIVED INDUCTIVELY  
Templates of prototypical behaviors enable an automated means to parse the resulting trace and 
characterize the positive and negative behaviors of the model.  Interestingly, these templates are not 
imposed on the system but are derived inductively by first defining the system interactions and then by 
executing the model to identify the naturally occurring results.  See Appendix A research products [9] 
and [13] for the research behind this finding. 
4.1.8.  ALL POSSIBLE INTERACTIONS FOR A MODEL CAN BE SUMMARIZED IN MATRIX FORM 
The execution environment provides an automated means to populate a Design Structured Matrix 
(DSM), tabulating all possible interactions.  Analysis of the DSM affords the system developer of a means 
to understand logical groupings of functions, and thereby supporting modularization and design 
synthesis. See Appendix A research product [13] for the research behind this finding. 
4.1.9.  SYSTEM BEHAVIORS COULD BE FORMALLY SPECIFIED CONSISTENTLY BY BOTH GOVERNMENT (IN 
REQUIREMENTS) AND CONTRACTORS (IN IMPLEMENTATION) 
A model described through a high level of abstraction effectively defines system behaviors at a 
fundamental level, as characterized by the system internal functions and by system-to-system external 
interactions.  Applying formal methods to the behavior description enables a precise description of the 
core interactions while eliminating the minutia of detail irrelevant to the functional description.  
MP is therefore just as useful pre-contract award as it is post-contract award, and may be used as a 
formal specification bridge between government sponsors as well as contractors/solution providers.  
Before writing requirements into a contract, MP can be used to test and debug those requirements at a 
solution-neutral level, exposing overlooked customer needs and expectations that ought to be included 
in the requirements that are handed to the solution developer(s).  The scope-complete scenario 
generation capability of MP regards the independence of interacting systems or components to allow 
the requirements analysts to try out and inspect all combinations of behaviors, and employ a constraint 
(requirement) discovery process to shape the overall behavior.  We impose or lift constraints in MP to 
observe the effects on the overall design, and to discover requirements that may not have been found 
otherwise until much later. 
4.1.10.  MANY ARCHITECTURE MODELING LESSONS LEARNED ARE FORMALIZABLE INTO ANTI-PATTERNS 
The anti-patterns presented in Appendix E are also available for specification as part of a contract to 
encourage good MBSE practices in both solution-neutral and solution-oriented models developed for 
the implementing organization.  A conceptual data model (CDM), which underlies every system model, 
is a powerful logical language for expressing typical architecture modeling anti-patterns (practices to 
avoid) in a tool-agnostic manner. The anti-patterns provide decision makers with the means to express 
expectations for model quality and maturity, and enable new and experienced architects to purge many 
known poor modeling practices from their models. Early testing in the Innoslate tool has codified these 
anti-patterns and picked up hundreds of overlooked deficiencies in dozens of different academic and 
real project models.  Further testing, however, is needed to fine-tune the anti-patterns, common 
exception cases, and metrics to assist with model maturity tracking over time. The high-level 
specification of the anti-patterns enables model developers to delegate the checking and enforcement 
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of typical modeling best practices to the modeling software tools, allowing them more time to focus on 
the harder problems that human capital is needed for (e.g., verification, validation, refutation, pattern-
finding activities).  
4.1.11.  DESIGN REFERENCE MISSIONS (DRMS) ARE USEFUL SOURCE DATA FOR MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Development of Design Reference Missions (DRMs) has been found to be an effective tool for scoping 
short- to medium- term MBSE analysis efforts (such as pilot projects).  A DRM provides a solution-
neutral operational context and a thorough description of a problem space for a modeling team to use 
as source data.  The process of developing a DRM answers many important questions about a problem 
space, and lays the groundwork for a successful model-based development or analysis effort.  See 
sample DRMs developed by NPS students in Appendix A, research product [10] and Appendix G section 
1. 
4.1.12.  MP MAY BE MAPPED TO SYSML AND OTHER GRAPHICAL NOTATIONS 
We conducted a preliminary crosswalk of MP with the System Modeling Language (SysML) and the 
Lifecycle Modeling Language (LML).  This crosswalk shows a relatively straightforward mapping from 
graphical languages forward to MP to achieve basic executable MP models that can be modified and 
optimized for generating many more scenarios at higher scopes after translation from SysML or LML.  
These results are promising for graphical modeling language users who want to gain access to the 
comprehensive scenario coverage and V&V capability delivered by MP. 
 
4.2.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
We recommend the following actions be taken based on the interim results of this research project: 
4.2.1.  DEVELOP A BODY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE EFFICACY OF NEW MODELING METHODS 
Adopting new modeling methods in an organization will be more socially than technically difficult. 
Workforce members who have been satisfied with older methods for a long time may resist changing 
their way of doing business. To fully support the newer methods, the workforce should be provided with 
convincing evidence that new modeling methods are better than current or previous methods being 
used with respect to their experience.  MBSE pilot projects should be used to develop a body of 
evidence on the efficacy of the modeling methods proposed for wider adoption. 
4.2.2.  USE MONTEREY PHOENIX ON MBSE PILOT PROJECTS 
Deploy the proposed methodology described in Appendices D and E on pilot MBSE projects for testing 
and implementation on actual systems.  This process should also be deployed with urgency to those 
tasked with identifying and purging a design of errors, vulnerabilities, safety hazards or other critical 
issues, or Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V).   
4.2.3.  TRAIN MODEL DEVELOPERS HOW TO VERIFY AND VALIDATE SYSML MODELS USING MP 
Model developers with less modeling experience may initially have an easier time learning and wielding 
MP than very experienced model developers.  Where possible, start the less experienced modelers on 
MP, having them use models developed by experienced SysML modelers as source data.  This will 
effectively teach them two skills at once: analysis of SysML models, and verification and validation of 
those models using MP.  This approach enables the MP modelers to serve as “smart ignoramus” (Berry, 
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1998), asking clarifying questions, exposing tacit assumptions, and providing constructive feedback that 
helps to improve the quality of the SysML model and of the design it describes. 
4.2.4.  GENERATE SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS AUTOMATICALLY FROM OTHER BEHAVIOR VIEWS 
Utilize MP’s automatic and scope-complete event trace generator to automatically create formal 
specifications for sequence diagrams that can be transcribed to and from SysML.   Manual generation of 
many use case scenarios as event traces or sequence diagrams is time consuming, error prone, deficient 
in scenario coverage, and no longer necessary. Human capital should be focused on creating behavior 
models such as activity diagrams and state transition diagrams with logic constructs, and automated 
tools tasked with extracting sequence diagrams / event traces from those models. 
4.2.5.  SCRUB THE REQUIREMENTS WITH MP BEFORE WRITING CONTRACTS 
Use MP to test and debug high-level system requirements before they are written into contracts.  This 
activity can help to stabilize the requirements earlier, and significantly reduce program costs by resulting 
in fewer engineering change proposals and contract modifications later in the system’s lifecycle.  The 
new capability to control emergent behaviors with MP may have a strong positive influence the 
requirements analysis process.  Be sure to record and track all V&V issues discovered (as 
counterexamples to good behavior) by MP analysis, so that the cost of exposing and fixing each issue 
early can be compared to that of finding and fixing the same behavior in a later lifecycle phase. 
4.2.6.  USE THE MODEL’S ONTOLOGY AS A LANGUAGE TO DESCRIBE MODEL ANTI-PATTERNS 
A conceptual data model (CDM) / ontology underlies every system model, and is a powerful logical 
language for expressing typical architecture modeling anti-patterns in a tool-agnostic manner. Decide 
which of the anti-patterns from Appendix E the organization will adopt, map them to the organization’s 
chosen ontology, and communicate them as standard practices to be avoided in models developed for 
them. 
4.2.7.  FORMALIZE THE TYPES AND DEFINITIONS OF EMERGENT BEHAVIOR FOR USE IN RISK ANALYSIS 
The classification taxonomy for different types of emergent behaviors (e.g., simple, weak, strong, 
spooky, positive, negative, etc.) in current use may benefit from formalization based on the example 
models generated as research products of this project over the past year.  There is practical value to 
having clear criteria for classifying different types of emergent behavior, such as aiding in the conduct of 
risk analysis (e.g., in assigning priorities to behaviors), and developing metrics for emergent behaviors in 
designs (e.g., to generate stoplight charts for behaviors of concern).  Now that a collection of example 
models containing different types of emergent behaviors exists, the classification taxonomy should be 
tested and refined into a standard way to assign and substantiate the types of emergent behavior. 
4.2.8.  PROVIDE MODELERS WITH GOOD SOURCE MATERIALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT EFFORT  
Modeling teams should be provided with a Design Reference Mission (DRM) or similar document that 
summarizes the operational context and operating environment assumptions for the system they are 
being asked to model.  The DRM answers many important questions about a problem space, and lays 
the groundwork for a successful modeling effort.  
4.2.9.  DEVELOP A GRAPHICAL GATEWAY TO MP 
While analysts of critical systems typically have a mathematical or formal methods background that 
comes with coding experience, others may have strong preferences for graphical languages and tools.  
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Some may even have an aversion for coding languages that, if overcome, would enable them to take 
advantage of the full strength of the MP language.  These users would benefit from a graphical gateway 
to MP analysis, whereby specially profiled graphical models in a notation of the user’s choice are 
automatically translated into MP event grammar as a starting point for expansion and analysis natively 
in MP. To encourage those who are used to working exclusively in graphical languages to learn and use 
MP, extend or profile familiar views and notations in common use (such as SysML) to enable the first 
draft of MP code to be generated from them. 
4.2.10.  INFORM THE WORKFORCE OF THE RESULTS OF THIS RESEARCH 
Have the research team summarize the content in this report into a workshop format that can be 
delivered to the NAVAIR workforce in Q1 of FY18.  This will ensure a good transition of the many interim 
research products resulting from this effort in a timely manner, and have a positive impact on Systems 
Engineering Transformation. 
 
4.3.  FY18 PLANS 
FY18 research will continue to develop version 4 of the MP approach and tool, mature and extend the 
models used in the FY17 research, investigate methods for deriving nonfunctional / system-wide 
requirements, collaborate with RT-170 to experiment with SysML-to-MP translation, and incorporate 
successful outcomes into course content at NPS.  Specific products will include: 
 
 workforce development content to include a reference document, examples, and exercises that 
include principles of behavior modeling, process flow, analysis, and interface to SysML 
 requirements outline for a model development execution environment that enables the 
researcher to evaluate the model results through finding patterns in the resulting traces, 
deriving templates, evaluating outcome probabilities, and structuring the results 
 
The FY17 deliverables are mature enough to be presented to the NAVAIR workforce in a workshop 
format as early as FY18 Q1, to teach how to use MP with hands-on exercises. 
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APPENDIX C: COLLABORATOR COURSES THAT INTEGRATE OR CONTRIBUTE RESEARCH RESULTS  
 




SE4151 provides an advanced introduction to building products 
and services from the perspective of theory, frameworks, and 
practice. The aim is to instill a sense of perspective about the 
means and consequences of integrating system components with 
regards to cost, schedule, and performance issues.  Students in the 
winter quarter of AY17 performed subsystem integration on the 
RT-176 UAV model in the Innoslate tool, which was used to inform 





This course provides an integrative forum for PD21 students to 
stimulate holistic, global, and innovative thinking, and to enable 
critical evaluation of current modes of architecture.   We discuss 
physical systems and software systems, heuristic and formal 
methods, and the students complete research assignments that 
provide opportunities to further learn how systems architecture 
principles are applied in a variety of application areas. Students in 
the spring quarter of AY17 refined models developed by the 
SE4151 students in Innoslate and in MP in order to inform the UAV 
MP modeling analysis for this SERC task. 
SE0811 Thesis in Systems 
Engineering  
This is a thesis course for students pursuing a systems engineering 
degree. PD21 students take this course in the last two quarters of 
the 721 curriculum to conduct independent research under the 
guidance of an advising team consisting of an advisor and a second 
reader. The primary thesis contributions resulting from this 
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APPENDIX D: MONTEREY PHOENIX OVERVIEW 
This section contains a version of work authored by John Quartuccio and Kristin Giammarco appearing as 
the chapter entited “A model-based approach to investigate emergent behaviors in systems of systems” 
in Engineering Emergence: A Modeling and Simulation Approach, edited by Larry Rainey and Mo 
Jamshidi.  Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group, in press. 
D.1.  INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental challenge in Systems Engineering is predicting the behavior of the operational system 
(Aizier et. al, 2012). Early identification of emergent behaviors—particularly those that are unexpected 
or unwanted—contributes to reduction of program cost and schedule risk (Auguston, 2009a), and 
enables failure analysis to promote mission success (Rambikur, 2017a). Studying system behaviors in 
advance of operations typically involves generating use cases using a graphical approach (as is done 
using architecture modeling tools and fault tree analysis (Rambikur, 2017b), an executable approach (as 
is done using simulation tools), or a combination of both. Creating executable models of systems 
increases human understanding of behaviors that emerge, as models can be executed over a number of 
conditions to study various outcomes. However, many of today’s system behavior models are over-
constrained (Auguston, 2010) (Auguston, 2012), suppressing behaviors that should be addressed prior to 
operation, and failing to expose the very behaviors we are seeking to prevent from occurring. 
 
Monterey Phoenix (MP) is a Navy-developed systems engineering approach and tool with a 
demonstrated ability to automatically generate comprehensive sets of use cases containing many more 
emergent behaviors than other methods in use today (Auguston, 2009a; Giammarco, 2017a). The 
analysis value of these MP-generated use cases is the following: the scenarios not only contain wanted 
behaviors, but also unwanted behaviors including incorrect, hazardous, or otherwise undesirable 
behaviors in systems designs (Giammarco et. al, 2017b).  Giammarco and Giles (2017a) summarize some 
examples of emergent behaviors that prompted the identification of new system requirements. These 
behaviors would have been difficult to find without using MP. The comprehensive sets of MP-generated 
use cases are scope-complete, which means they contain the exhaustive set of possible combinations of 
behaviors and interactions among the modeled systems up to a scope limit. Scope is the number of loop 
iterations permitted in the behavior models. The scope-complete aspect of the automatically generated 
use cases, further described in (Giammarco and Augston, 2013; Auguston et. al, 2015; Giammarco and 
Giles, 2017a), provides the ability to test the system model for the presence or absence of behaviors of 
concern up to the specified scope.  
 
Prior to describing how MP works (section D.2), a significant discussion on the concepts leveraged by MP 
is presented for background and context.  These concepts include abstraction, behavior, activity, events, 
modeling, simulation, system, system of systems, complex systems, and emergence.  
D.1.1.  BEHAVIORS, ACTIVITIES, ACTIONS, AND EVENTS 
1. A behavior is a set of events or actions, typically leading to some observable end point. 
2. An event has a beginning and end, and an order of precedence. Both the existence of a 
precedence relationship and the lack of a precedence relationship (or concurrency) are 
relevant relationships among events. 




Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
25 
 
4. An action is considered the same as an event. 
5. An activity is a higher level abstraction of an event. A process is an activity. 
 
Starting with these general definitions, concise uses of these terms need to be employed in order to 
develop the concepts of behaviors within some technical or engineering construct. To that end, let us 
first define a behavior as a set of events or actions. Behaviors are typically represented by multiple 
systems interacting with the environment and among the systems. There is also typically some sort of 
observable outcome (e.g. formation flight). 
The temporal relationships among events is of critical importance to a behavior. A particular event or 
any be detectable or observable entity has a beginning and an end. This allows us to then discuss the 
concept of precedence. Precedence enables ordering of multiple events. One event may occur before 
the other, establishing a precedence relationship. Alternatively, multiple events may occur concurrently 
or simultaneously, without a precedence relationship. This lack of precedence is also a temporal 
property, but in this case, the events are independent of each other. Both the existence of a precedence 
relationship or the non-existence of a precedence relationship are attributes of an event. 
An event also has an additional relationship, inclusion. This relates the hierarchy of events; all events 
must have a root or source. One may think of a radio that would either send or receive a message. The 
event under consideration is the send or receive action, the operator is the radio, and the operand is the 
message. And so one can say that the send and receive events stem from, or are included in, the radio. 
Complex events may be described within multiple subordinate events that stem from a composite 
event. For example, there may be many functions necessary for the radio to send or receive, and so the 
operator and operand remain the same, but the send and receive events may be made up of many sub-
events. 
Further, actions and events are treated synonymously within this report, though when used in reference 
to the code to follow, events will be used exclusively. Furthermore, and more simply, an activity is a 
higher-level abstraction of an event. Following a defined process is an example of an activity. 
D.1.2.  ABSTRACTION, MODELS, AND SIMULATION 
1. A model is an abstraction of the physical or instantiated system, developed in order to 
represent essential elements of the design. 
2. The model must represent a complete set of behaviors, and analytically derive a means to 
enable intended behaviors, while restricting unintended behaviors. 
3. A simulation is any instance of behavior extracted from the model. 
 
The concept of an abstraction is critical to any discussion of a model. Simply put, a model represents 
only those functions necessary for a particular purpose. As an example, a training system may need to 
model a radio in order to provide instruction. However, the model radio does not need to perform the 
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Many are familiar with the popular quote from Box that “all models are wrong, but some are useful” 
(Box, 1976). Buede developed a consistent thought as he defines a model as “any incomplete 
representation of reality, an abstraction” (Buede, 2009). He further elaborates that a model may take on 
the following forms: 
• a physical representation such as an aircraft wind tunnel model, used to identify 
aerodynamic properties to be projected to the final configuration, 
• a mathematical representation such as a random number generator or a physics-based 
simulation of aerodynamic loads, and 
• a mental representation that may or may not agree with a physical representation, a 
mathematical representation, or reality. 
 
Buede’s key point is that the “essence of a model is the question or set of questions that the model can 
reliably answer for us” (2009). Though a model is an incomplete abstraction of reality, yet the model 
must enable a complete set of answers to the questions of interest. Thus in order to represent 
behaviors, a model needs to identify all aspects of these behaviors to include both positive and negative 
interactions. 
Consistent with those definitions, consider the following: “A model is a representation of something. It 
captures not all attributes of the represented thing, but rather only those seeming relevant. The model 
is created for a certain purpose and stakeholders” (Weilkiti, 2013). 
A simulation is any particular instance of a behavior model. Using the previous examples, a simulation of 
the wind tunnel aerodynamic model is one run of the wind tunnel, consisting of the initial set-up 
description and final results.  The simulation of a physics-based computer model is one execution, based 
on a set of inputs, and the computed results.  
D.1.3.  A BEHAVIOR MODEL 
We have established that a behavior is a set of events or actions leading to some observable end-point, 
and a model is an abstraction of the physical or instantiated system, developed in order to represent 
essential elements of the design. 
A behavior model in the analytical or computational realm consists of some algorithm that employs a 
formal language to derive a set of events, representing essential interactions and relationships held 
within the model. This approach avoids the specification of parameters of the design for as long as 
possible; concentrated effort can evaluate the underlying and intrinsic interactions within the design 
and within the design interaction with other systems, the user, or the environment. The temporal 
(precedence) and hierarchical (inclusion) properties combine to enable concise behavior definition. 
A formal language, based in set theory, is fundamental to the description of a behavior model. As 
opposed to a natural language, with possibilities for misinterpretation, a formal language is complete, 
consistent, and verifiable. Monterey Phoenix (MP) employs such a language, explicitly for the purpose of 
defining and modeling behaviors. As a lightweight formal method, models developed within MP rely 
upon investigation by the developer for verification in lieu of formal proofs. This approach encourages 
an interactive methodology for development. 
 
 




1. A behavior model employs a formal language to derive a set of events, representing 
essential interactions and relationships of the design. 
2. This analysis is performed at a level of abstraction that isolates the logical behavior of the 
design. 
D.1.4.  A TAXONOMY OF COMPUTER-BASED MODELS 
Within the construct of computer modeling and simulation of dynamic behaviors and interactions within 
a system, a proposed taxonomy of models and simulation including behavior models, system dynamics 
modeling, discrete-event modeling, and agent-based modeling, as summarized in Table 1 and discussed 
in the following outline (Borshchev, 2013; Buede, 2009). The latter three types require some level of 
parameterization, such as speed, range, timing, etc. in order to project the system dynamics. Behavior 
modeling produces a logically sound architecture and therefore it should be conducted prior to more 
detailed analysis. 
Behavior models are developed at a high level of abstraction, prior to populating parameters to the 
model. Monterey Phoenix (MP) is a behavior model, employing lightweight formal methods, which 
develop all possible traces, or use cases, within a given scope of execution (Auguston, 2016). Behavior 
models focus on the essence of the interactions within a system and with external interfaces, producing 
a logically-sound architecture. MP is available for anyone to use at http:\firebird.nps.edu. 
Discrete-event models are used for analysis of transactions such as those encountered in financial 
institutions, logistics and shipping companies, and other behavioral representations.  Credit card 
transactions, commercial airlines transportation, and commercial cargo and shipping systems are 
examples of processes that are well suited for discrete event modeling. Many aspects of systems of 
systems are tied to such discrete events. The Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) formulation 
was introduced by Zeigler (1976) enabling a mathematical representation of system dynamics based on 
event sequences. 
System dynamic models are used to simulate classic time-based problems in engineering. Many of 
these models simplify the system dynamics to a set of first or second order differential equations, code 
these as difference equation with a variable or fixed time-step, and solve these equations using a 
numerical method such as Runge-Kutta or other applicable algorithm (Yakimenko, 2011).  Most 
engineering disciplines use system dynamic models to study phenomena and their applications to 
include within dynamics of structures, particle dynamics, flight dynamics, computational fluid dynamics, 
and most scientific fields. Interestingly, systems theory as applied to other fields also gain benefit from 
this method, including economics, sociology, and psychology. MATLAB and Simulink (Yakimenko, 2011) 
and AnyLogic (Borshchev, 2013) are commercially available packages that model system dynamics. 
Higher order languages such as any instantiation of C or Java™ can also be used to develop these 
models. 
Agent-based Models are more recently developed than system dynamic models and discrete event 
models. The agent-based formulation describes the individual parameters or variables within the agent, 
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the expected interactions between agents, and the overall context of the environment including number 
of dimensions, number of agents, constraints of the problem. AnyLogic is a commercially available 
platform for agent-based modeling (Borshchev, 2013). 
Hybrid models combine aspects of two or more types of models. 
 




Early system architectures 
Cross-domain analysis  of  all  behaviors 
Event-based models 
sequenced by events 
Production and manufacturing 
Transportation systems Logistics 
Agent-based models 
sequenced by an agent 
Organizational behavior 
Animal behavior 
Biological systems  
Crowd dynamics  
Search patterns 
System dynamics models 
physics, time-based 
Flight dynamics 
Weapon separation dynamics & trajectory 
Computational fluid dynamics  
Dynamic structural loading 
Hybrid models Autonomous platforms  
Combined effects 
 
D.1.5.  FURTHER DEFINITIONS PERTAINING TO SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
D.1.5.1.  System 
We use a general definition of a system, supported by International Council on Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE), International Organization for Standardization (ISO), International Electro- technical 
Commission (IEC), and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). These definitions apply to 
“engineered” systems that have specifically and intentionally been developed by humankind, as 
opposed to natural systems (Kossiakoff & Sweet, 2003).  From this perspective a system is defined as “a 
combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes” (ISO/IEC/IEEE, 
2015) where the elements may include “hardware, software, firmware, people, information, techniques, 
facilities, services, related natural artifacts and other support elements” (Pyster et. al, 2012). 
Crawley et al. define a system as “a set of entities and their relationships, whose functionality is greater 
than the sum of the individual entities” (2015).  The authors further indicate that this definition the 
system includes both “entities and their inter-relationships.” This construct of a system has a natural 
extension to concept of Systems of Systems (SoS), in this case each entity is a system. 
D.1.5.2.  Model Based Systems Engineering 
The INCOSE defines Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) as 
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“the formalized application of modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification, 
and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout 
development and later life cycle phases.” (INCOSE, 2007; INCOSE, 2010; INCOSE, 2015)  
D.1.5.3.  System of Systems 
INCOSE further defines a System of Systems (SoS) as a system of interest “whose elements are 
managerially and/or operationally independent systems. These inter-operating and/or integrated 
collections of constituent systems usually produce results unachievable by the individual systems alone.  
Because an SoS is itself a system, the systems engineer may choose whether to address it as either a 
system or as an SoS, depending on which perspective is better suited to a particular problem” (INCOSE, 
2015). 
The Defense Acquisition Guide (DAG) adds context to this definition that is directly consistent with the 
ODUSD Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems (Guide, 2008).  The DAG reads as follows: 
“Most DoD capabilities today are provided by an aggregation of systems often referred to as System of 
Systems (SoS). A SoS is described as a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and 
useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities. For complex SoS, the 
inter-dependencies that exist or are developed between and/or among the individual systems being 
integrated are significantly important and need to be tracked. Each SoS may consist of varying 
technologies that matured decades apart, designed for different purposes but now used to meet new 
objectives that may not have been defined at the time the systems were fielded.” (Defense, 2013, p. 
167) 
Dahmann et al. indicated that the system of systems framework and processes “push systems thinking 
beyond the traditional arena of new system development and acquisition to address the reality of 
today’s system challenges of integrating and evolving existing systems to meet changing needs” (2009).  
Within the continuum of types of systems of systems, consistently, consideration has been given to 
basic categories of managerial control to include “directed, collaborative, virtual, and acknowledged” 
(Dahmann and Baldwin, 2008; Maier, 1996; (Maier, 1998), an emphasis on the importance of 
acknowledged systems have “recognized capability needs, management, and SE at the SoS level as well 
as autonomous objectives, management, and technical development approaches of the systems which 
contribute to the SoS capability objectives” (Dahmann et al., 2009). 
D.1.5.4.  Complex systems and emergence 
Mitchell (2009, p. 13) defines a Complex System as “a system in which large networks of components 
with no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, 
sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution.” 
Taking into account the “self-organizing” aspects of unique “emergent” or collective behavior that can 
occur with no internal or external command and control of the individual elements or agents, Mitchell 
(2009, p. 13) also proposed a second definition of a Complex System as “a system that exhibits nontrivial 
emergent and self-organizing behaviors.” 
Complexity is closely aligned with Chaos Theory (Gleick, 1987; Strogatz, 2012; Waldrop, 1993) and its 
implications apply to many disciplines, including economics, psychology, sociology, medicine, and 
organization dynamics; within the traditional sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics; 
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and within engineered systems including network theory, computer science, integrated systems, and in 
general, systems of systems.  Characteristics associated with complexity include emergence and self-
organization. These aspects cannot be deduced by decomposing the system to its smallest components, 
but they are tied to the individual system behaviors, and are associated with interactions among the 
systems and their environment.  Aspects that also contribute to those collective behaviors include, 
dependence on initial conditions, diversity within the population of agents, and the environment itself 
(Calvano & John, 2004; Miller & Paige, 2009; Mitchell, 2009, p.13; Strogatz, 2012; Waldrop, 1993).  
Considering these definitions, a complex system is special sort of system of systems that demonstrates a 
property known as emergence. 
Zeigler (2016) identified the importance of both positive and negative emergence. Crawley et al. (2004) 
relate complex systems and emergence, including the concept of positive and negative as follows: 
“Complex systems have behaviors and properties that no subset of their elements have. Some of these 
are deliberately sought as the product of methodical design activity. While achieving these behaviors, 
the designers often accept certain undesirable behaviors or side effects. In addition, systems have 
unanticipated behaviors commonly called emergent. Emergent behaviors may turn out to be desirable 
in retrospect, or they may be undesirable.” 
Emergence is exhibited through collective behavior and self-organization of a system of systems that 
cannot be deduced by the investigation of an individual constituent system, element, or agent. This 
behavior depends not only upon the properties of an individual constituent system, but the collective 
behavior emanates from tightly coupled interactions among the individuals within the group (Calvano & 
John, 2004; Miller & Paige, 2009; Mitchell, 2009, p.13; Strogatz, 2012; Waldrop, 1993).   
Maier defined an emergent property as “a property possessed by an assemblage of things that is not 
possessed by any members of the assemblage individually” (2015, p. 21). Maier (2015) further outlined 
types of emergence, summarized in Table D.2. Fromm (2005) had also developed a classification of 
emergence, summarized in Table D.3, based on the level of interaction of constituent systems within the 
whole system. There exists some level of inconsistency between these descriptions; the former 
description may be better suited for an early assessment of predictability of the system response, while 
the latter description lends itself to a computational method that can enable automated classification 
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Table D.2:  Types of emergence, derived from Maier (2015, p. 21-22). 
 
Type  Emergent property mapping to modeling and simulation 
 
Simple  Behavior readily predicted, model abstracted with lower complexity than the 
actual system 
Weak Behavior consistent with known properties of the system and readily and 
reproduced by simulation; however, system interactions must be included in the 
model 
Strong  Behavior consistent with known properties, but unable to reliably predict where 
[or when] emergent properties occur 
Spooky  Behavior inconsistent with known properties of the system components, even 
with model equivalent to complexity of the system 
 
 
Table D.3:  Classification of emergence, indicating a particular designation based on the level of 
interaction and feedback, developed by Fromm (2005). 
Class Title Description 
Type I Simple Interaction of systems producing some global 
response, but without feedback to the systems. 
Type II Weak Inclusive of the interactions of Type I, but with feed- 
back from the global response to the systems. 
Type III Multiple Inclusive of Type II, but with multiple systems. 
Type IV Strong Inclusive of Type III, with the interaction of these 
multiple systems with each other creating additional 
global responses. 
 
Having established this foundation in terms and concepts, the next section provides a general 
description of how MP works by introducing the MP event grammar and the MP-Firebird 
implementation (tool) available publicly at firebird.nps.edu. 
D.2.  FUNDAMENTALS OF MONTEREY PHOENIX 
MP is a formal approach and language for modeling system behaviors and business processes. Its unique 
model partitioning strategy enables its novel scenario generation capability: component behaviors are 
separated from one another, and also component behaviors are separated from component 
interactions. The event trace generator computes all possible combinations of events modeled within 
each component, then filters out invalid combinations using the interaction constraints as rules defining 
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behaviors that should be disallowed from a logical, simplification, or design point of view (Quartuccio). 
The fewer constraints imposed, the more behaviors appear in the model output. Each automatically 
generated event trace scenario represents one possible outcome of behavior, and it is these resulting 
event trace scenarios that are inspected for unwanted behaviors arising as a result of missing logical, 
simplification, or design constraints. 
D.2.1.  MP EVENT GRAMMAR 
Using a concise pseudo-code language, MP employs event grammar rules to define the model. The two 
main binary relations used to construct event traces (particular instances of behavior) are precedes and 
includes. Sequencing of events is done using a PRECEDES relation, and decomposition of events is done 
using an IN relation. An event grammar rule specifies the structure for a particular event type in terms of 
these two relations, and has the form 
 
A:  right_hand_part; 
 
where A is an event type name, the colon after A represents the IN relation (A includes 
right_hand_part), and the semi-colon indicates the end of a grammar rule. An event to the left of the 
colon may be root (having no parent) or composite (having a parent and at least one child), and events 
on the right hand part of the rule may be composite or atomic (having a parent but no children). A 
typical convention in MP is to associate each system or major component with a root event, as in the 
following example. 
 
ROOT System_A:  Event_1  
                    Event_n; 
 
The above code specifies a root event called System A.  Equivalently, we might call this event 
“System_A_Events”, but as a convention, we abbreviate root events that contain other events belonging 
all to the same system as simply the system name.  In this case, System_A includes two events 
Event_1 followed by Event_n.  A space or return carriage indicates a precedence relation between 
composite or atomic events within a root event.   
 
A grammar rule may be composed of any combination of composition operations from Table D.4. 
 
Table D.4 MP Event Grammar Concepts. 
A: B C;  Ordered sequence of events (A includes B followed by C) 
A: (B | C); Alternative events (A includes B or C) 
A: [B];  Optional event (A includes B or no event at all) 
A: (* B *); Ordered sequence of zero or more occurrences of event B in A 
A: (+ B +); Ordered sequence of one or more occurrences of event B in A 
A: {B, C}; Unordered set of events B and C in A (B and C may happen concurrently) 
A: {* B *}; Unordered set of zero or more occurrences of event B in A 
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Behavior is modeled in the event grammar as an algorithm for each component, describing the step-by-
step procedure by which it achieves a well-defined goal. See the following MP code for an example 
event grammar.  There are three distinct grammar rules in this code: one for the Car race (defined as a 
set of one or more Cars), one for Car (defined as the possible behaviors that a car does), and one for go 
straight (defined as possible different behaviors in going straight).  
 
ROOT Car_race:  {+ Car +}; 
     Car:     go_straight   
      (*  ( go_straight | turn_left | turn_right )  *)    
              stop; 
     go_straight: ( accelerate | decelerate | cruise ); 
 
In this example, Car_race is a root event, Car and go_straight are composite events, and 
turn_left, turn_right, stop, accelerate, decelerate, and cruise are atomic events. 
D.2.2.  MODELING COMPONENT BEHAVIORS SEPARATELY 
A key feature of MP analysis is the modeling of component behaviors separately. To maximize 
prediction of emergent system of systems behaviors, we model the behaviors of the system under 
design, the behaviors of external systems, and behaviors in the environment, separately. The MP event 
grammar is employed to create separate grammar rules for each component or system, as in the 
example grammar rules below. 
 
ROOT System_A:  Do_System_A_actions; 
ROOT System B:      Do_System_B_actions; 
ROOT Environment:   Do_Environment_actions; 
 
D.2.3.  MODELING DATA FLOW AS EVENTS 
Because MP uses an event grammar, data inputs and outputs are not explicitly modeled in the same way 
they are in data flow-oriented languages.  Instead, they are represented by actions (captured as events) 
that may be performed on that data. For example, a data input/output would be modeled implicitly in 
the MP events, and look like “Send_data” or “Receive_data” rather than “data,” as in the code below. 
 
 
ROOT System_A:  Send_data; 
ROOT System B:      Receive_data; 
 
D.2.4.  MODELING COMPONENT INTERACTIONS SEPARATELY 
In addition to separating component behaviors from each other as in the System_A and System_B 
code example above, MP uniquely separates the definition of the behaviors within a system from the 
definition of the interactions of the events among multiple systems, the user, an environment 
(Auguston, 2016; Giammarco and Auguston, 2013). This model partitioning strategy allows the model 
developer flexibility and control in describing the intended behavior of the overall SoS through the 
addition and removal of interaction constraints.  This is a missing concept in other modeling 
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methodologies, in which system interactions are often found hard-coded – that is, tied to the specific 
instances of related actions in a given scenario – in activity diagrams and sequence diagrams.  In MP, a 
COORDINATE statement is used to impose an interaction constraint upon events in different roots, 
separately from the component grammar rules.   The code example below coordinates the Send_data 
and Receive_data events from the different roots in the code example above, since sending actions 
generally precede receiving actions (a logical constraint).  
  
COORDINATE  $a: Send_data           FROM System_A, 
   $b: Receive_data   FROM System_B 
  DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD; 
 
The literal interpretation of the code is an instruction to pick up each instance of Send_data and 
Receive_data present in each scenario, and add a precedence relation to each pair.  When this 
constraint is added, any traces containing just one and not the other will be rejected, meaning in this 
case there would be no scenarios of sending but not receiving, or receiving but not sending.  A rationale 
for rejecting these traces is provided in Appendix E, which describes such scenarios as anti-patterns to 
good architecture practice (see in particular E.3.3.5 and E.3.3.6). 
 
Event sharing, where two or more systems have some events in common, is yet another way of behavior 
coordination. The SHARE ALL composition is used to specify events to be shared.  Shared events may 
appear in the root event at any hierarchical level.  For example, a constraint may be written to explicitly 
state that System_A and System_B share all instances of certain events when they occur.  For 
example: 
 
System_A, System_B  SHARE ALL  Common_event; 
 
 
The Common_event must be present in each root event for which event sharing is specified.  The 
below code shows this, and puts together all of the introduced concepts so far with a SCHEMA name.  





ROOT System_A:  Send_data 
                    Common_event; 
 
ROOT System B:      Receive_data 
                    Common_event; 
  
COORDINATE  $a: Send_data            FROM System_A, 
   $b: Receive_data    FROM System_B 
  DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD; 
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Event sharing is often used as a device for abstracting interactions that are not essential to the modeling 
effort.  In this example, Common_event might be something like Close_session.  
D.2.5.  EVENT ITERATION 
Composition operations for event sequencing, concurrency, optional events, alternate events, and 
recurring events were defined in Table D.1.  Event repetition can be used to specify iteration of certain 
behaviors.    For example, the following model demonstrates how to create a simple recurring message 
flow from a Sender to a Receiver.  Figure D.1 shows an example of what one of the traces from this 




ROOT Sender: (* send *); 
 
ROOT Receiver: (* receive *); 
 
COORDINATE $x: send      FROM Sender, 
               $y: receive FROM Receiver 




Figure D.1. An example composed traces for a simple pipe/filter architecture pattern.  The green boxes 
represent root events, the blue boxes represent atomic events.  The dashed arrows represent inclusion 
relations and the solid arrows represent precedence relations. 
 
More examples can be found in research products [4] [5] [6] [8] [9].  The MP language is fully described 
in (Auguston 2016).  
D.2.6.  THE SMALL SCOPE HYPOTHESIS 
The Small Scope Hypothesis (Jackson, 2006) postulates that most errors in computer code can be found 
within a relatively small number of iterations or execution cycles.  Modeling objects, as opposed to 
behaviors, Jackson implemented this concept through the Alloy Analyzer tool (Jackson, 2002).  The Small 
Scope Hypothesis and the associated Alloy Analyzer tool provided inspiration to apply this practice from 
the software domain in the systems engineering domain with Monterey Phoenix and the MP-Firebird 
tool (Giammarco, 2013).  MP-Firebird, or Firebird, employs the Small Scope Hypothesis to find most 
errors in MP behavior specifications with relatively few loop iterations through the code.  For example, 
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the scenario depicted in Figure D.1 depicts three iterations of the send-receive events. Iteration in MP 
code is defined by loops (*…*) (+…+) that contain the events to be repeated, like (* send *) and 
(* receive *) in the case above.  Events may occur zero times, one time, two times, etc., up to 
the specified scope.  Since the model execution time grows exponentially as the scope increases, using 
the Small Scope Hypothesis is a practical concession we make when we do not need to provide a 100% 
behavior scenario coverage guarantee of all possible behaviors at infinite scope.  Instead, MP provides a 
100% behavior scenario coverage guarantee of all possible behaviors at a reasonably small scope.  For 
example, if the loop in the model above Figure D.1 were permitted to run for an infinite number of 
times, Figure D.1 would grow infinitely tall, and it is very unlikely we will gain any more information 
running at say, scope 100, than we would running at scope 3.  Therefore, we limit the scope at which we 
run the model, not only for practical reasons, but also because the small scope is usually sufficient to 
spot behavior patterns taking shape.  Using the Small Scope Hypothesis keeps the run times brief for 
near-immediate user feedback that exposes a great number of errors or behaviors of concern without 
waiting for lengthy computations to complete.   
D.2.7.  EXHAUSTIVE SCENARIO GENERATION, UP TO THE SCOPE LIMIT 
In MP, exhaustive scenario generation up to the scope limit provides a 100% coverage guarantee of all 
possible behaviors within the specified scope.  A reasonable scope limit for most models is 3.  Running 
an MP model at a scope higher than 3 will take longer, but may be desired to accumulate confidence 
and evidence for certain critical systems, such as the absence of certain behaviors of concern.  Assertion 
checking is an automated process that can be used to detect known or suspected behaviors, especially 
at higher scopes and other cases where the number of scenarios may be far too large to undergo 
manual inspection.   
Exhaustive, of course, also refers to the model content present, and like any model, cannot overcome 
errors of omission.  In other words, MP does not provide entirely new and different events in the 
scenario output that were not already present in some form in the MP model.  What it does provide is 
many permutations of the events that are present, but potentially not considered before they were 
explicitly laid out as possible event traces.  Errors of omission may, however, be realized by the modeler 
upon inspection of the output.  For instance, Nelson’s example in (Giammarco & Giles, 2017a) 
demonstrates an error of omission that came to light by its stark absence against the backdrop of all 
other combinations of events, resulting in a model revision to correct the omission as well as a new 
requirement for a communications subsystem on an International Space Station resupply spacecraft.   
Realization of the omission error was a result of human cognition aided by the automated tool, neither 
of which realized the presence of the error without ability from the other. 
D.2.8.  HOW TRACE DERIVATION WORKS 
In execution, MP generates all possible outcomes of the model.  Within MP, these instances are called 
event traces (or use cases) and are based on the scope of execution of the model.   
The event traces emerge as a result of a derivation process. It is guided by the grammar rules and 
composition operations created by the model developer. The event trace derivation determines the MP 
semantics. Trace derivation for schemas, roots, and composite events is performed top-down and from 
left to right following the event grammar rules. Composition operations act like “crisscrossing” 
derivation rules that may add new events and relations to the trace under derivation. 
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As John Hughes (1989) has put it in his influential paper: “The way in which one can divide up the 
original problem depends directly on the ways in which one can glue solutions together.” Event 
grammar rules in MP provide a way of modularization, or dividing the system’s behavior model into a 
hierarchy of component behaviors. Composition operations are separated from the grammar rules, and 
define interactions (or dependencies) between behaviors of components. This separation and 
supporting mechanism of “gluing” behaviors together are the core features of MP. 
 




ROOT R1: …; 
ROOT R2: …; 
… 
ROOT Rn: …; 
 
event trace derivation starts with an implicit grammar rule 
 
S: { R1, R2, … , Rn }; 
 
and deploys the composition operations interlacing the root rules and defined in BUILD blocks attached 
to the schema and to other event grammar rules.  See (Auguston 2016) for a description of how to use 
BUILD blocks and other language features, and for a more complete description of the derivation 
process. 
D.2.9.  USING THE MP-FIREBIRD ANALYZER 
MP is an executable architecture modeling approach and language. Figure D.2 shows the graphical user 
interface of the MP-Firebird tool, available publicly at firebird.nps.edu.  Event traces (use cases, or 
examples of behavior) are generated by executing MP pseudo-code, or schema, performing the trace 
derivation process described in the previous subsection in order to represent all possible behaviors 
within the model. Each section of code is written and edited in the designated text-box.  The schema is 
executed by the run “button,” while the scope of execution controls the number of iterations computed 
in accordance with the schema. Upon execution, diagrams of an exhaustive list of traces are produced. 
 
 




Figure D.2: The Monterey Phoenix (MP) modeling environment, illustrating the code window (left), 
scope of execution (top left), the current trace (right), and all traces produced by executing the schema 
(far right). MP is available for anyone to use at firebird.nps.edu. 
 
Events are visualized as boxes, and dependencies between pairs of events as arrows marked by the 





Figure D.3: MP diagram key. 
 
Other MP-Firebird features currently deployed include: 
 Three main view options: code only, split screen code and graph, and graph only, 
 Syntax highlighting and real time syntax checking 
 Import of user-defined code as well as readily accessible, preloaded examples (Import menu) 
 Drag and drop manual arrangement of boxes and arrows on graphs 
 Zoom in / out 
 Node collapsing / expanding 
 Node hiding / showing 
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 Sequence, Force, and Swim Lanes layouts (additional architecture views to be defined) 
 Export high resolution images of full or user-cropped trace diagrams 
 Export code only (.mp) or code together with customized diagrams (.wng). 
 Keyboard shortcuts as described in the Help menu 
 
To browse example models, open the Import menu and select any example under “Load example:”. 
To load a model that you downloaded or saved to your hard drive, open the Import menu and select 
“Load .mp or .wng file:”. 
To start a new MP model, simply load an example model and type directly over it, reusing as needed. 
To save a model you developed, open the Export menu and select Code (for an .mp text file) or Code 
and Graph (for a JSON .wng file containing any adjustments you made to box and arrow positions). 
To save a picture of a trace, open the Export menu and select Current Trace. 
To save only a portion of a trace, open the Export menu, select Define Crop Area, and then use the 
selection tool to highlight the portion of the graph to be included in the export. 
 
D.3.  MP MODELING BEST PRACTICES 
This section contains some MP modeling best practices, and conventions that have made MP modeling a 
pleasant and productive experience for its users.  More advanced modeling heuristics are provided in 
Appendix G, section 4.3. 
 Read and refer to the MP Manual to learn all of the language concepts available to you 
(Auguston, 2016).  This appendix is a brief overview to get you started. 
 Save/backup your MP file frequently. 
 Sometimes it makes sense to copy/paste from, or directly edit, an existing MP model to create a 
new MP model, rather than start a new MP model from scratch.   In this case, make sure that 
you are aware of and fix any copy/paste errors, and remove all irrelevant comments from the 
new model. Wrong comments are dangerous! 
 Proceed with the MP model building incrementally. Start with a simple (bare bones) model of 
the main actors/behaviors. Add actors (root events), events, and coordination for them one at a 
time.  Introduce composite events to encapsulate the logically complete actions. Run your code 
with scope 1 to weed out obvious errors. 
 After each update, run the MP model to detect/fix coding errors and omissions in the MP code, 
and to decide about the appropriate scope, which is an essential aspect for non-trivial MP 
models. This may include adding specific iteration scope descriptions for selected iterators, like 
(*<1..4> A *) to steer the number of iterations. This way you can get around the scope 
limits imposed by Firebird, if needed. 
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 Style practices.  Application of the following conventions may seem like a waste of time at first, 
but it is not.  Standard conventions greatly increase the speed of comprehension and provide 
structure to minimize ambiguity in natural language.  Whatever the naming conventions you 
use, consistency is paramount. 
o Always begin every model with some introductory comments. Include at least the name 
of author, date, and short description of the purpose of this MP model.  
 
/* File_name.mp 
Start with a brief description of the model purpose, and how to 
use it. 
Also include any interesting analysis highlights or results. 
 
created 2017-09-30 by J.Doe 
modified 2017-09-30 by K.Doe updated the comments, corrected 
typos in the model 
*/ 
 
o Use indentation to emphasize the order of events and main control structures 
(alternatives and iterations). Try to have one event name per line of MP code. Usually 
we read MP code top-down, and it always helps when while reading the code we can 
figure out what will be the order of events evolving from that code. 
o Use indentation and blank lines to make the MP code more readable, and to help 
readers follow the top to bottom stream of events. This practice will become very 
critical when the size of the MP model starts to grow.  Use blank lines to separate 
composite event definitions. 
o Make sure that event names are readable and informative. In many cases event names 
will be pseudo-code statements describing activities or actions within the system and its 
environment. 
o MP is case sensitive.  In all cases, use an underscore to separate words of the phrase. 
This is not required by MP, but is strongly suggested.  Use of CamelCase is not 
recommended. 
o MP keywords are UPPERCASE in most instances with a few exceptions.  (Refer to 
keywords listing in Section 7 of (Auguston, 2016) – the MP manual). Therefore usage of 
ALL_CAPS for event names is not recommended, in order to avoid confusion. 
o Most events in a model are usually actions, but some high level (composite) events can 
be equated with components, processes, states, and even time phases.  One can use 
good language grammar to help a reader determine which type of these event types 
you are representing: 
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 Choose a noun-oriented name for an event that represents a thing, component, 
object, system, person, or organization (e.g., Operations_Team, UAV).  Use title 
case for capitalization. 
 Choose an imperative present-tense verb or verb phrase for an event name that 
represents an action (e.g., Provide_command, Analyze_object).  Use sentence 
case for capitalization. 
 You may choose an indicative past-tense verb or verb phrase to represent zero-
duration or instantaneous events (e.g., Authorization_received, 
Object_detected).  This format can be especially useful for naming shared 
events. Use sentence case for capitalization. 
 Choose an indicative present continuous verb or verb phrase for an event name 
that represents a state (e.g., Conducting_Maintenance, Powering_Up).  Use title 
case for capitalization. 
 Choose a process-oriented phrase for an event name that represents an 
activity, process or time phase (e.g., Mission_Preparation, On_Station).  Use 
title case for capitalization. 
 Root events are often named for the component that embodies the event 
pattern listed on the right hand side of its grammar rule.  Composite events may 
be named for high-level processes that contain a sequence of composite or 
atomic events, or for time phases that contain a sequence of events. 
 Validation begins when MP model starts to run smoothly. Now it is time to select the graph 
visualization mode (Sequence, Swim Lane, etc.) and to start browsing generated scenarios/use 
cases with respect to how well it captures your or your stakeholders’ intent. 
 During inspection on Firebird using the Sequence view, you may need to move some boxes to 
see all of the inclusion relations.  The graphing algorithm currently used stacks the inclusion 
relation behind precedence relations, so they can be hidden. 
 Though the relationships are correct, the current graphing algorithm on Firebird does not always 
stack events inside composite events in the correct position on the artificial timeline.  If you 
have orange composite events in your traces and some events appear out of order, move the 
misplaced event to the correct position on the “timeline.”  The arrows are correct, as is the MP 
output file, but in the current implementation of the Firebird GUI, the box placement sometimes 
is not.  
 If you move any boxes, to save your changes you need to export a .wng file. 
 The number of generated traces may start to grow into hundreds and thousands. It becomes 
cumbersome to find traces satisfying particular properties, for instance, you’d like to see 
whether there are traces containing the event Bell_Rings. To help, MP has IF and MARK 
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IF #Bell_Rings > 0 THEN MARK; FI; 
 
will mark traces satisfying the condition, and make it easier to find them in the trace browsing 
scrollbar. 
 After the initial draft of the model is stabilized, add incrementally more actors/behaviors, 
repeating the test/debug activities after each increment.  
 Insert comments in your MP code explaining your major design decisions and rationale for MP 
constructs used in the code. The best comments answer the question “Why?”, e.g., why this 
alternative or iteration has been placed in this particular position in the model, or why this 
coordination construct is here. 
 Models are built by humans and usually need testing and debugging. For this purpose MP has 
CHECK construct for assertion checking (or for counterexample rendering) and SAY clause for 
annotating generated traces with messages. It is similar to the print statements used for 
debugging source code in traditional programming languages. After all, MP is executable 
modeling language. SAY clauses may provide answers to queries about number of events of 
interest already assembled into the trace segment, or indicate reaching certain point in the 
derivation process. This can be done both in BUILD blocks and in the schema’s code. The MARK 
construct combined with IF composition operation makes it possible to highlight traces of 
interest for testing/debugging purposes. 
 MP is not a programming language, like C, C++, or Java. It is a behavior specification language. 
MP grammar rules are supposed to define all behaviors you want to have. So, if you want to 
describe behaviors with and without Bell_Rings event, make sure that your event grammar 
contains all alternatives - if the grammar does not contain a behavior you want to have, there is 
no way how you will obtain it. Now, it may contain also many unwanted behaviors, but we can 
weed them out using ENSURE, COORDINATE, and SHARE ALL. Consider these constructs as a 
powerful event trace filters and devices for identifying important requirements. These are the 
principles of writing MP code. 
 
D.4.  A METHODOLOGY FOR GETTING STARTED WITH MP 
There are six steps in a proposed methodology to build behavior models that support SoS requirements 
development and analysis (Quartuccio).  The first four are presented in this last section of Appendix D, 
and the last two are presented in the first section of Appendix E. 
D.4.1.  STEP 1: DEVELOP A NARRATIVE OF THE BEHAVIOR 
It is typical that the model developer is not the end-consumer of the model and associated analysis, and 
so SME input is critical to the process. The SME may be an end-user of the product, the funding sponsor 
of the project, or perhaps the developer of a legacy or predecessor system. The model developer begins 
the methodology by interviewing the relevant SMEs necessary to formulate a complete, analyzable, 
internally consistent, and elegant, in accordance with qualities of great models (Qualities, 2017). 
 
 
Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
43 
 
Criteria: This step is complete when the SMEs have described the relevant behaviors, constraints, 
assumptions, and limitations of the SoS. A written and approved document is the recommended 
practice, especially if significant resources are spent in order to develop the model. 
Decision: The developer needs to decide to proceed to next step, repeat this step, or go back to a 
previous step. 
Proceed if documentation provides an internally consistent starting point, then proceed with the 
model development. Further input will be needed at the next steps, and so the description may 
be incomplete during the first cycle of the methodology. 
Repeat if the description is not consistent in its description and definitions; clarification will be 
necessary. 
Go Back if the SME input cannot be reconciled; consideration needs to be given to address 
conflicts with sponsoring authority as necessary. 
D.4.2.  STEP 2: IDENTIFY MP EVENTS 
A simple example is used throughout each of the next sections in order to illustrate how to describe 
events in MP. This model includes two root events A and B, with corresponding atomic events “task a” 
and “task b.” Root events are typically the environment, a user, a system, or a component of the system.  
Subsequent events are typically actions taken by the root. 
The model was executed with scope of two, producing two traces. Trace 1 has a single atomic event for 
both roots A and B, while trace 2 has two atomic events for root A and a single atomic event for root B. 
SCHEMA simple 
ROOT A: 
{ + task_a + }; 
ROOT B: 
    task_b    ;         
   
 
 
Figure D.4: A simple MP model illustrating root events A and B, with corresponding atomic events “task 
a” and “task b” (top). The inclusion relationship is represented with a dotted line. The model was 
executed with scope of two, producing two traces (bottom). Trace 1 has a single atomic event for both 
roots A and B, while trace 2 has two atomic events for root A and a single atomic event for root B. 
The code for this model used the curly brackets { … } to indicate concurrent events, and the plus sign, 
“+,” surrounding task_a indicates that the number of events is at least one and up to the scope of 
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execution. Since this schema was executed at a scope of two, the output includes a trace with one “task 
a” event and a second trace with two “task a” events. Both traces have a single “task b” event. Each root 
description ends with a semicolon, “;”. 
 
Criteria: This step is complete when the relevant environment, users, systems, and components are 
defined as root events, and all functions are captured as atomic or composite events. 
Decision: Proceed to next step, repeat this step, or go back to previous step, as follows: 
Proceed when coordination with the SMEs affirms that all events are captured. 
Repeat if the SMEs identify significant errors. 
Go Back if fundamental problems exist in the narrative. 
 
D.4.3.  STEP 3: IDENTIFY COORDINATION 
Coordination establishes precedence relationships between events within roots A and B. In the simple 
illustration we can establish that in all cases, “task a” precedes “task b”, as illustrated in Figure D.5. The 
“DO...OD” command establishes a loop for asynchronous coordination so that all occurrences of “task a” 
precede “task b.” Events may also be shared by multiple roots using the “SHARE ALL” command. 
 
COORDINATE   $b: task_b 
DO COORDINATE <!> 
             $a: task_a 
         DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD; OD; 








Figure D.5: A simple MP model with coordination between atomic events from root A and B. 
Coordination from task a to task b for both traces are illustrated as solid lines, representing precedence 
relationships. The dotted lines are inclusion relations, so instances of task a are unordered.  As such, all 
occurrences of task a must be accomplished before task b. 
 
Criteria: This step is complete when coordination across all root events are complete. 
Decision: to proceed to next step, repeat this step, or go back to previous step. 
Proceed if the developer and SMEs agree with the coordination structure. 
Repeat if errors are found. 
Go Back if the root events need to be restructured. 
MP separates the behavior definition within a system (modeled as a root event) from the interaction 
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D.4.4.  STEP 4: DEFINE CONSTRAINTS  
At least three types of constraints are of concern to the developer. These include logical constraints, 
simplification constraints, and design constraints that form system requirements.  
A logical-type of constraint inhibits certain behaviors in order to maintain a realizable representation of 
the system. For example, consider a situation where a book may exist or not exist, and a student shall 
either read or not read the book. It is impossible for the student to read a book that does not exist, and 
so the model developer must restrict this sequence from the model. This is an example of a logical-type 
of constraint to be implemented in the model. 
The developer also needs to consider the impact of irregular activities within the model, especially in 
situations where emergent behaviors may exist, but are not obvious. Consider a situation where a 
passenger train can either stop at a station or not stop at a station; and a passenger at the station can 
either board the train or not board the train. The developer may decide to restrict the condition where 
the passenger boards the train if it has not stopped. Under most situations, this restriction is reasonable; 
however if searching for irregular interactions, the constraint will inhibit the behavior that is of interest 
to the developer. In this case, irregular behavior may include the activity of a person illegally boarding a 
moving train. If restricted, the developer would not identify this potentially emergent event. Therefore, 
the developer needs to ensure that the model represents all areas of concerned by not overly-
constraining the model. 
A simplification-type of constraint is conducted at the discretion of the developer in order to 
concentrate the effort of the model where significant impact is to be expected. For example, if a student 
completes an assignment and turns it in to the professor, and the professor is responsible to grade all 
assignments that are turned in, a reasonable assumption is that the student’s assignment is graded by 
the professor. This is a simplification-type of constraint that enables a comprehensive structure of the 
model, but it will limit the results to other areas that may be of greater interest to the developer. 
A design-type of constraint establishes requirements of the system in order to ensure that sufficient 
boundaries are placed on the interaction of relevant events. For example, if a developer was interested 
in finding a means to ensure that vehicle operators remain alert while driving their car, it would not 
benefit the developer to target children under twelve years old for the methods or intervention. 
Considering a physical system, if an aircraft is executing a landing mode, it would not make sense for the 
vehicle to simultaneously attempt to re-fuel from another aerial platform. This would be a typical 
design-constraint such that certain behaviors are limited to particular modes or states of the platform. 
Implementing constraints for our simple example: if the schema were executed without the 
coordination of precedence relationships at the top of Figure D.5, the developer would find the 
occurrence of a trace shown in Figure D.6, where “task b” occurs without a logical predecessor of “task 
a”. Examples include a read function that cannot occur before a write function, or a receive function 
that cannot occur before a send function. Clearly in these cases, a logical-type of constraint is needed 
for the model. The code in Figure D.7 ensures that the number of “trace a” events is greater than the 
number of “trace b” events. 
Examples of each type of constraint are available in Appendix A, research product [8]. 
 
 




Figure D.6: A simple Monterey Phoenix (MP) model with a missing constraint, allowing a trace in which 
“task b” exists without a corresponding “task a.” 
 
ENSURE ( #task_a >= #task_b); 
 
Figure D.7: MP code for a logical-type constraint on the simple model 
Criteria: This step is complete when all logical, simplification, and design constraints are implemented in 
the schema. 
Decision: Proceed to next step, repeat this step, or go back to previous step. 
Proceed when the developer and SMEs agree that the constraints are an appropriate 
representation. 
Repeat if constraints are missing or overly used, restricting desirable or actual behavior. 
Go Back if any part of the event structure needs to be reworked in order to satisfy the needed 
behaviors. 
Appendix E continues the description of this method with Steps 5 and 6. 
D.5.  SUMMARY 
The following are fundamental concepts of Monterey Phoenix (MP): 
 MP models behaviors of a design, as the developer systematically defines the events, adds 
temporal and hierarchical interactions, applies constraints, evaluates the results, and adjusts the 
definition as needed. 
 MP builds a model at a high level of abstraction, prior to adding parameters to the system 
description.  Evaluating the model with MP early in the development enables the use of a 
mature structure for follow-on simulations employing event-based models, agent-based models, 
time-based physical models including system dynamics, or hybrids of these methods. 
• MP employs a powerful language, or pseudo-code, that formally describes the behaviors within 
the system. The complete model is referred to as a schema. 
• All blocks in the system are considered as events. 
• A root event initiates a hierarchy of subordinate events.  These subordinate events are 
established by an inclusion relationship with the root event. 
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• Events also exhibit precedence relationships both within a root hierarchy and coordinated 
among multiple root hierarchies. 
• MP separates the definition of behaviors within the system from interaction with other systems, 
users, or the environment through coordination of inter-related events. 
• Atomic events are comprised of no constituent event, meaning that these events have a parent 
in the hierarchy, but no child events. 
• Composite events are comprised of one or more constituent events, meaning that these events 
have a parent in the hierarchy and at least one child event. 
 MP applies the Small Scope Hypothesis (Jackson, 2006) such that most issues in the model are 
found within relatively few iterations. 
• Execution of the MP schema (model) produces all possible outcomes within the scope of 
execution, thereby enabling a means to identify emergent behaviors. As seen in Appendix E, 
these results expose patterns of behavior leading to the need for analytic tools to interactively 




Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
49 
 
APPENDIX E: PRELIMINARY CATALOG OF REUSABLE ARCHITECTURE PATTERNS AND ANTI-PATTERNS 
 
This appendix captures preliminary work in cataloging reusable architecture model patterns and anti-
patterns of various types.  First, the steps for documenting Monterey Phoenix (MP) behavior model 
patterns is described with references to example MP behavior patterns.  Next, a crosswalk of MP, 
System Modeling Language (SysML), and Lifecycle Modeling Language (LML) behavior model patterns is 
presented.  Finally, some general anti-patterns to be avoided in architecture modeling are presented in 
the language of the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF) meta model.   
E.1.  IDENTIFICATION OF PATTERNS IN MP BEHAVIOR MODELS 
This section contains a version of work authored by John Quartuccio and Kristin Giammarco appearing as 
the chapter entited “A model-based approach to investigate emergent behaviors in systems of systems” 
in Engineering Emergence: A Modeling and Simulation Approach, edited by Larry Rainey and Mo 
Jamshidi.  Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group, in press. 
E.1.1.  STEP 5: IDENTIFY PATTERNS 
Appendix D describes four MP model construction steps that are prerequisite steps to identifying 
patterns in the MP results.  Readers should become familiar with those steps prior to using this section 
of the report. 
Patterns in MP behavior models can be identified using MP’s assertion checking functions along with the 
“MARK” and “SAY” commands.  Identifying patterns in MP models has several purposes that are critical 
to the system developer.  Some ways these patterns can be used include:  
• Quickly investigate large sets of automatically generated event traces, many of which may 
contain hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of traces. 
• Ensure that all generated traces contain only expected output, and are absent of instances of 
uncontrolled emergence. 
• Develop a repository of effective architectures that can be employed in future designs, including 
instances of desired emergence, thereby capturing positive lessons learned. 
• Develop a repository of ineffective or problematic architectures, including instances of 
unwanted emergence, thereby capturing negative lessons learned. 
Figure E.1 illustrates how behavior pattern detection can be done using MP. The code listed below the 
graph checks for scenarios where “task a” from a System A occurs before “task b” in a System B. If the 
condition is met, the trace is marked and annotated with the “SAY” command. Each of these checks can 
be formulated as templates of unique behavior in the model.  
 
 






  $alpha: task_a, 
  $beta:  task_b 
    ( 
         $alpha BEFORE $beta 
    )         
THEN MARK; SAY (“a is before b”); 
FI;   
 
 
Figure E.1. Top: A simple MP model showing an example task_a that precedes task_b.  Bottom:  MP 
code for detecting behaviors such that each trace that satisfies the condition that “a is before b” is 
marked and labeled. This capability establishes the means to identify templates, or patterns, in the 
results. 
 
Criteria: This step is complete when templates are associated desirable and undesirable behaviors of the 
model. 
Decision: Proceed to next step, repeat this step, or go back to previous step. 
Proceed when the developer and SMEs agree that the templates have been effectively implemented. 
Repeat if significant portions of the output cannot be resolved as expected behavior. 
Go Back if additional constraints are needed in the model. 
Examples of preliminary MP behavior model templates are contained in Appendix A research products 
[8] and [13].  Long term objectives include creating a repository of these templates to enable re-use of 
working and validated architectures, as well as abandoned ineffective or problematic architectures best 
avoided. 
E.1.2.  STEP 6: EVALUATE THE RESULTS 
Identifying and cataloging behavior patterns is a major step in and of itself, but is still the tip of the 
iceberg in behavior modeling research.  Given the behavior patterns and other results available from 
executed MP models, several types of analyses may be of interest to the developer, such as: 
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• Determining the probability of occurrence of any trace or outcome 
• Generating a summary of all interactions in the form of a Design Structure Matrix (DSM) or N- 
squared Diagram 
• Computing the throughput of data flow 
• Determining the sequencing and timing of events 
• Acertaining requirements for computing power 
Analysis of probability of each trace may be straight-forward for a very simple model, but the developer 
needs to ensure that the fundamental principles of statistics are followed closely. Not all architectures 
lend themselves to a viable solution. As described in Appendix A research product [9], the authors 
worked out certain conditions where an MP model can be used to define a Bayesian belief-network, and 
then probabilities of each trace could derived from a given set of assumptions. The conditions include 
the following: 
1. Each trace is an instance of the architecture and is represented as a directed graph without 
loops. This is a given for MP. 
2. Each trace has the same topology, such that a consistent Bayesian belief network may be 
applied to all traces. This is not typical for many models, since the scope tends to change the 
topology, representing additional iterations. And so the developer needs to maintain a 
single scope for all traces in the output. 
3. Constraints need to be written as conditional probabilities in order to be integrated to the 
belief network. 
4. An approach is defined to prorate probability after multiple constraints are applied to the 
model. Constraints tend to eliminate large segments of the belief network. 
5. Of note, the impact of an overly-constrained model will become apparent when attempting 
to implement a prorating scheme. 
Other analysis uses of MP models and the behavior patterns contained therein is a topic of future work, 
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E.2.  A CROSSWALK OF MP, SYSML, AND LML BEHAVIOR MODEL PATTERNS 
The table contained in this section are a result of a preliminary crosswalk performed among simple logical constructs available in several 
different modeling languages including SysML, LML and MP.  The mappings provide the beginnings of a formal specification that may eventually 
inform automated conversion from graphical languages into MP.  NPS PD21 student Ernie Lemmert contributed the SysML mappings to MP code 
as part of his ongoing thesis research.   
 
Table E.1.  Crosswalk of MP, SysML and LML Behavior Model Patterns 
Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML: 















LML: A decomposed by B.   
In Innoslate, “A” is the name of the diagram containing “B”. 
 
 










A: B C D; B'precedes'C'precedes'D'
'









A: Or_Action  






















Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
53 
 
Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML:  
B, followed by C, followed by D. 
  
 
/* A includes: B followed by C followed 
by D. */ 
 
A: B C D; 
 
 
/* Precedence may be denoted by a space 
between events, or a carriage return. The 
following rule is equivalent to the one 
above. */ 
 
A: B  
   C  























A: B C D; B'precedes'C'precedes'D'
'









A: Or_Action  
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML: 
B, followed by C, followed by D, shown with SysML Pins/ObjectFlow 
 
 
/* A includes: B followed by C followed 
by D. */ 
 
A: B C D; 
 
 
/* Data flow is not a separate concept in 
MP event grammar.  For example, there is 
no separate concept for items like 
“status report”. The data flow around a 
status report would be modeled as 
“Send_status_report” and 
“Receive_status_report” with a plain 





B, followed by C, followed by D, shown with required input/outputs (green 
triggers) and optional input/outputs (gray). 
 
 









A: B C D; B'precedes'C'precedes'D'
'









A: Or_Action  
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML:  






/* A includes: B or C */ 
 




/* An alternate expression can be used to 
name the specific decision point branches 
as events in their own right.   
 
A includes: Or_Action, followed by B if 
Yes or C if No, then Merge_Action. */ 
 
A: Or_Action 
   ( Yes B | No C ) 
   Merge_Action; 
 
       
 
/* Whether or not to include the action 
and branch names as separate events in MP 
can be based on user preference. */ 
 
LML: 
B or C. The “Or Action” can be a named block phrased as a question (with Yes/No 











A: B C D; B'precedes'C'precedes'D'
'









A: Or_Action  






















Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
56 
 
Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML:  
B occurs for as long as some predefined condition holds true. 
 
  
/* B occurs zero or more times */ 
 
A: (* B * ); 
 
/* The model’s global scope setting 
controls the number of loop iterations. 
For example, a scope of 2 will include 
all scenarios where B occurred zero, one 
or two times (illustrated in the three 
distinct scenarios below). */ 
 
 






















A: B C D; B'precedes'C'precedes'D'
'









A: Or_Action  
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML: 




/* B repeated between m and n times  */ 
 
A: ( * <m..n> B * ); 
 
/* The local scope setting used here can 
control the number of loop iterations 
separately from the global scope.  For 
example, a local scope of 1..2 will admit 
only scenarios where B occurs once or 
twice (illustrated in the two distinct 
scenarios below). */ 
 
 



















A: B C D; B'precedes'C'precedes'D'
'









A: Or_Action  






















Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
58 
 
Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML : 





/* B occurs one or more times */ 
 
A: ( + B + ); 
 
/* The iterator plus composition requires 
at least one instance of the event(s) 
contained. For example, a scope of 3 on 
this model will include all scenarios 
where B occurred one, two, or three times 
(illustrated in the three distinct 
scenarios below). */ 
 























A: B C D; B'precedes'C'precedes'D'
'









A: Or_Action  
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML:  
B occurs if the OR Action outcome is Yes, or does not occur if the OR Action 







/* B is optional */ 
 
A: [ B ]; 
 
 






/* Alternatively, Or_Action is followed 
by Yes then B, or No */ 
 
A: Or_Action ( Yes B | 
               No ); 
 
 
         
LML: 
B occurs if the OR Action outcome is Yes, or does not occur if the OR Action 

















ROOT A: C; 
ROOT B: D; 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A,  
  $y: D FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      




ROOT A: ( C | D ); 
ROOT B: ( E | F ); 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A,  
  $y: E FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      
      OD; 
COORDINATE $x: D FROM A,  
  $y: F FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML:  
A and B are components, each with its own swim lane. 
Activity C is allocated to A, activity D is allocated to B, and C precedes D. 
 
 




/* A and B are root events (components).  
Event C is in root event A, event D is in 
root event B. */ 
 
ROOT A: C; 
ROOT B: D; 
 
/* The constraint that C precedes D is 
added using a coordinate composition 
since the events are in different roots. 
*/ 
 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A, 
           $y: D FROM B 
       DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; 





A and B are assets, each with its own parallel branch. 











ROOT A: C; 
ROOT B: D; 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A,  
  $y: D FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      




ROOT A: ( C | D ); 
ROOT B: ( E | F ); 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A,  
  $y: E FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      
      OD; 
COORDINATE $x: D FROM A,  
  $y: F FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML: 
A and B are components, each with its own swim lane. 
Activities C and D are allocated to A, activities E and F are allocated to B. 
C precedes E and D precedes F. If a Yes decision is made, C will occur, if not, D. 
 
 
/* A and B are root events. 
Event C or event D occurs in A, and event 
E or event F occurs in B. */ 
 
ROOT A: ( C | D ); 
ROOT B: ( E | F ); 
 
 
/* C precedes E and D precedes F through 
inter-root coordination. */ 
 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A, 
           $y: E FROM B 
       DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; 
       OD; 
 
COORDINATE $x: D FROM A, 
           $y: F FROM B 
       DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; 








A and B are assets, each with its own parallel branch. 
Actions C and D are allocated to A, actions E and F are allocated to B. 
C precedes E and D precedes F.  If a Yes decision is made, C will occur, if not, D. 
 
!






ROOT A: C; 
ROOT B: D; 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A,  
  $y: D FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      




ROOT A: ( C | D ); 
ROOT B: ( E | F ); 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A,  
  $y: E FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      
      OD; 
COORDINATE $x: D FROM A,  
  $y: F FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML: 
A and B are components, each with its own swim lane. 
Activity C is allocated to A, and activities D and E are allocated to B. 
C precedes D if Yes, or E if No. 
 
/* A and B are root events. 
Event C or event D occurs in A, and event 
E or event F occurs in B. */ 
 
ROOT A: C; 
ROOT B: ( D | E ); 
 
 
/* C precedes E or D through inter-root 
coordination. */ 
 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A, 
           $y: ( D | E ) FROM B 
       DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; 









A and B are assets, each with its own parallel branch. 
Action C is allocated to A, and actions “Or Action,” D and E are allocated to B. 
C precedes the Or Action.  D occurs if Yes, or E occurs if No. 
 
  !
ROOT A: C; 
ROOT B: ( D | E ); 
COORDINATE $x: C FROM A,  
  $y: ( D | E )  
                 FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      




ROOT A: ( C | D ); 
ROOT B: E; 
COORDINATE $x: ( C | D )  
                 FROM A,  
  $y: E FROM B 
 DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y;      




ROOT A: C; 
ROOT B: C; 
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML:  
A and B are components, each with its own swim lane. 
Activities C and D are allocated to A, and activity E is allocated to B. 
C or D precedes E. 
 
/* A and B are root events. 
Event C or event D occurs in A, and event 
E occurs in B. */ 
 
ROOT A: ( C | D ); 




/* C or D precedes E through inter-root 
coordination. */ 
 
COORDINATE $x: ( C | D ) FROM A, 
           $y:  E        FROM B 
       DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; 









A and B are assets, each with its own parallel branch. 
Actions “Or Action,” C and D are allocated to A, and action E is allocated to B. 
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Activity Diagram Corresponding MP Code and Graph(s) 
SysML: 
A and B are components, each with its own swim lane. 
Activities C and E are allocated to A, and activities F and G are allocated to B. 
An object flow with an ObjectNode was used to represent D. 
  
/* A and B are root events. 
Event C or event D occurs in A, and event 
E occurs in B. */ 
 
ROOT A: C D E; 




/* All instances of event D are shared by 
root events A and B. */ 
 






A and B are assets, each with its own parallel branch. 
Actions C and E are allocated to A, and activities F and G are allocated to B. 






Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
65 
 
E.3.  GENERAL ANTI-PATTERNS TO AVOID IN ARCHITECTURE MODELING  
This section contains a version of work authored by Kristin Giammarco appearing as the conference 
paper entitled “Architecture Modeling Software Analytics: Model quality and maturity assessment using 
automated tools,” in proceedings of the 12th Annual System of Systems Engineering Conference, 
Waikoloa, HI, June 18-21, 2017.  The heusitics have been recast as anti-patterns, and translated into the 
DoDAF / UPDM meta model language. 
Building a model in any tool requires a way to organize the descriptive content.  A structured 
language provides “parking places” for different kinds of information about the system or SoS, its 
components, the general functions and specific behaviors performed by the components, the 
interactions among the components, and all the constraints governing the proper interactions within 
the system and between the system and other systems or components in its environment. This language 
groups related elements (such as components, or functions, or requirements) into classes, and defines 
attributes (such as name, number, and description) and allowable relations among the classes (such as 
component performs function, and function satisfies requirement).  In modeling tools that do not have a 
native conceptual language like this, system architects often define their own ontology for class names 
and relationships to give the model of the system a predictable and reusable structure. The product of 
this definition is a model of the model referred to as a meta-model or a conceptual data model (CDM).  
A common CDM provides a standard for use by different organizations and systems so that the same 
data has the same meaning to everyone involved.  Maier and Rechtin (2002) describes a data model as 
that which “specifies data that a system retains, and the relationships among the data.”   
Figure E.1 shows four small conceptual data model examples used for architecture modeling:  the 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework Meta Model (DM2) (DODAF, 2010), the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) Profile-Based Integrated Architecture (UPIA) (IBM, 2010), the System 
Description Language (SDL) (Long & Scott, 2011), and the Lifecycle Modeling Language (LML) (LML 
Steering Committee, 2015).  It demonstrates the conceptual similarities in the terms used in each 
language that are things or physical objects that perform processes that exchange matter or energy.  
Because any system can be described in these terms, data models are powerful languages for reasoning 
about common entities and relationships at a very high level of abstraction. 
The list of anti-patterns that follows is a catalog or menu of practices from which experienced 
architects can select general guidelines for assessing their models for well-formedness.  They are 
expressed in natural language and in the DODAF /UPDM vernacular. The entity terms referred to in the 
anti-patterns (e.g., activity, performer, resource) are defined in (DODAF, 2010).  The anti-patterns are 
poor practices to be generally avoided; they are experienced-based, and some have certain exception 
cases included with their description.  Some anti-patterns are more or less restrictive than others, 
allowing the architect to use a combination that best fits the intent.  The method used for developing 
the CDM-based heuristics upon which these anti-patterns are based is described in (Giammarco, 2014) 
and (Giammarco, 2012). 
A conceptual data model underlies every system model, and the basic concepts in many CDMs are 
compatible.  A CDM provides a powerful logical language for expressing typical architecture modeling 
analytics in a tool-agnostic manner. The anti-patterns presented herein provide decision makers with 
the means to express expectations for model quality and maturity, and enable new and experienced 
architects to purge many known poor modeling practices from their models.  Automatic detection of the 
anti-patterns has already been implemented and tested in the Innoslate tool, demonstrating that 
automatic detection of these types of patterns is possible and useful.  Testing with automation has 
turned up hundreds of model deficiencies across dozens of different academic and real project models.  
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Further testing will fine-tune the automated detection with common exception cases, as well as metrics 
to assist with model maturity tracking over time.  
As the Navy and other DOD agencies transition to MBSE, a list of anti-patterns like the one that 
follows can be provided as a precise yet tool-neutral specification for models developed for the 
customer organization.  Finally, the high-level specification of anti-patterns enables the heavy lifting of 
enforcing such modeling lessons learned to be delegated to the modeling software tools, freeing the 
developers to focus on creative and pattern-finding tasks that are best suited for biological processors.  
 
 
Figure E.1.  Four simple CDM examples.  Things doing processes exchanging matter and energy, in 
example taxonomies of DM2, UPIA, SDL, and LML. From research product [7]. 
 
E.3.1.  HIERARCHY ANTI-PATTERNS 
E.3.1.1.  An activity, performer, or rule (requirement) having no children and no parent.   
As the model matures, activities, performers and rules (including requirements) typically will not stand 
on their own, but appear as part of a hierarchy (either decomposing a parent entity, or being 
decomposed by a child entity). A hierarchy is useful for grouping and organizing entities of the same 
class.  
E.3.1.2.  An activity, performer, resource, or rule (requirement) having more than one parent. 
It is possible that an entity has more than one parent by mistake.  However, an entity may belong to 
multiple hierarchies as a deliberate decision. Multiple parents may be desired in such cases as when 
entities are being reused in modular, composable architectures, or being mapped to multiple 
taxonomies.  In some cases it can happen accidentally, which results in ambiguity about which is the 
correct path of parentage.   
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E.3.1.3.  A performer or activity having exactly one child. 
Performers, activities, and in general any entity, are usually decomposed into two or more children, or 
no children at all (if they are the lowest level entity intended). Decomposing an entity into just one other 
entity may be a redundant equivalency. This anti-pattern may be ignored if this is a work in progress 
(more children will be added), or the one-to-one decomposition relationship is intentional for style 
reasons approved by the lead architect. 
E.3.1.4.  A performer or activity having more than [#userdefined] children. 
For model comprehension, it is strongly recommended to limit the number of entities that appear at a 
given level. Buede (2009) recommends the optimum number to be between 3 and 6 activities; Miller 
(1956) uses a 7 plus or minus 2 heuristic. Regrouping a large number of entities at one level in a 
hierarchy often helps to break up the description into manageable chunks.  For example, decompose a 
performer with 24 child performers into 4 new performers, each with 6 child performers. The 4 new 
performers are used to group the otherwise large number of entities. 
E.3.2.  FUNCTIONAL/PHYSICAL ALLOCATION ANTI-PATTERNS 
E.3.2.1.  An activity that is not performed by any performer. 
Activities that have not been allocated to a performer lack a physical embodiment. The physical object 
that will perform the activity should eventually be specified. If an activity cannot be mapped to a single 
performer, consider regrouping the activities / performers to support the assignment of activities to 
specific performers. This regrouping will enable a clear work breakdown structure that delineates "who 
or what" (performer) is responsible for "doing what" (activity). 
E.3.2.2.  A performer that does not perform any activity. 
Performers that have not been allocated any activity lack functionality. If a performer exists without an 
associated activity, it may be idle or unnecessary, or it may be that its activity has been overlooked. Each 
physical form should be allocated to a corresponding function. 
E.3.3.  FUNCTIONAL INTERACTION ANTI-PATTERNS 
E.3.3.1.  An activity that produces some resource, but does not consume any resources.   
To preserve equilibrium, an activity should not be able to produce a physical output without having 
consumed some physical input at some point in the past. A couple of recognized exception cases in 
modeling are 1) the use of "stub" activities, during executable modeling development or for simulation 
debugging, and 2) on a top-level context diagram where an unmodeled resource is assumed, and not 
explicitly shown because it is beyond the scope of the model.  
E.3.3.2.  An activity that consumes a resource, but does not produce any resources.  
As a corollary to the preceding anti-pattern, an activity should not be able to consume an input without 
producing some output.  This is an alternate expression of the law of conservation of matter and energy.  
The same exception cases for modeling also apply to this anti-pattern.   
E.3.3.3.  An activity that does not produce or consume any resources.  
An activity that does not produce or consume any resources is either idle, or may be intended to define 
a closed process.  More realistically, all activities will interact with at least one other activity at some 
point. Even undesired interactions should be modeled, to aid the specification of counteractions. 
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E.3.3.4.  An activity that produces and consumes the same resource.   
A “looping” resource is one that is produced by the same activity that consumes it. In an abstract model 
this may not be a problem, but at a simulation level this concept is not executable. The looping resource 
should be moved one level down into the decomposed view of the activity it is leaving and re-entering, 
to show distinct sub-activities that produce and consume it. 
E.3.3.5 A resource that is not produced by some activity.   
A resource that is not produced by any activity has an unspecified source. If there is no source for the 
resource, the implication is that it appears from nowhere or is otherwise never sent by any source 
activity. 
E.3.3.6.  A resource that is not consumed by some activity.   
A resource that is not consumed by any activity has an unspecified destination. If there is no destination 
for the resource, the implication is that it disappears to nowhere or is otherwise never received by any 
destination activity. 
E.3.3.7.  A resource that is neither produced nor consumed by some activity.   
No resource should be isolated; each should have at least one relationship to some activity. 
E.3.4.  PHYSICAL INTERACTION ANTI-PATTERNS 
E.3.4.1.  A performer that does not connect to at least one connector.   
To support interactions with other performers of any sort, a performer needs to connect to at least one 
connector.  (In UPDM, a Connector is an abstraction of a Needline, which is a concept present in earlier 
versions of the DoDAF meta model.) 
E.3.4.2.  A connector that connects to fewer than two disjoint performers.   
A connector is a point-to-point concept that applies a pairwise relationship between connected 
performers. If a connector is connected to less than two performers, its specification is incomplete. 
E.3.4.3.  A connector that connects to more than two disjoint performers.   
A connector is a point-to-point concept that applies a pairwise relationship between connected 
performers. If a connector seems to need more than two connection points, consider modeling the 
connector as a performer instead.  
E.3.4.4.  A connector that does not transfer any resources.    
A connector with no resources assigned to it may be unnecessary or incomplete. 
E.3.4.5.  A resource that is not transferred by any connectors.   
An resource that has not been assigned to a connector may be overlooked in the requirements for that 
connector. 
E.3.4.6.  Two performers that exchange some resource, but are not connected by any common 
connectors.   
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E.3.4.7.  A resource exchanged between two performers that is not transferred by any common 
connector that connects those performers.   
All resources exchanged between performers need to be assigned to a logical or physical connection 
between those performers. 
E.3.4.8.  A performer that does not produce or consume any resources to or from any other 
disjoint performer.   
Performers that do not have any interactions are either idle, or intended to define a closed system. 
More realistically, all performers will interact with at least one other performer at some point. Even 
undesired interactions should be modeled, to help the specification of counteractions. 
E.3.5.  TRACEABILITY ANTI-PATTERNS 
E.3.5.1.  An entity that is not related to any other entity.   
Entities that have no relations to other entities may be artifacts of early editing that are often 
unnecessary to retain. Deletion after verifying there is no longer any need for them is usually 
recommended.  
E.3.5.2.  An activity that is not subject to any rule (requirement).   
Any activities that are not subject to some rule (requirement) may be missing a tracing, or unnecessary. 
Exceptions may apply to modeled activities or functions of external systems outside the scope of the 
requirement specification for the system under design. Another exception case is made for a root 
activity at the top of an activity or function hierarchy, since such an entity is typically used for context 
only.  
E.3.5.3.  A performer that performs an activity that is not constrained by a rule (requirement) that 
also constrains the performed activity.   
Performers are related to requirements through the activities they perform. If a performed activity is 
not constrained by the same rules as its performer, necessary behaviors may be overlooked. 
E.3.5.4.  A resource that is not subject to any rule (requirement).   
Any resources that are not subject to some rule (requirement) may be missing a tracing, or unnecessary.  
E.3.5.5.  A connector that is not subject to any rule (requirement).   
Any connectors that are not subject to some rule (requirement) may be missing a tracing, or 
unnecessary. 
E.3.5.6.  A leaf-level rule (requirement) that does not constrain any entities in the Performer, 
Activity, Resource, or Connector class.  
A rule (requirement) that does not constrain any of these modeled entities is either unnecessary or has 
not yet been traced in the architecture model. 
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E.3.6.  STANDARDIZATION ANTI-PATTERNS 
E.3.6.1.  Two performers that exchange some resource through performed activities, but are not 
constrained by a common rule (standard).  
Performers that interact through their performed activities should have at least one rule (standard) in 
common, so that they are consistently constrained to support the interaction. (In LML, standards may be 
attached to an Artifact entity and assigned a “Standard” label.) 
E.3.6.2.  A resource is produced by some activity aA of some performer pA and consumed by 
some activity aB of another performer pB, but aA and aB are not subject to any common rule 
(standard) that constrains both pA and pB.   
Activities that interact through exchange of resource(s) should have at least one rule (standard) in 
common with the performers that perform them, so that they are consistently constrained to support 
the interaction. 
E.3.6.3.  An exchanged resource between two performers that is not subject to some rule 
(standard) that constrains both performers.   
A resource exchanged between interacting performers should have at least one rule (standard) in 
common with its source and destination performers, so that the resource and the performers are 
consistently constrained to support the interaction. 
E.3.6.4.  A connector that connects two performers and transfers a resource between those 
performers that is not subject to some rule (standard) that constrains both performers.   
A connector that connects interacting performers should have at least one rule (standard) in common 
with the performers that they connect, so that the connector and connected performers are 
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APPENDIX F: INSTRUCTIONS FOR DOWNLOADING UAV MODELS  
The following MP models of UAV behavior were developed to support this research effort.  They 
demonstrate some of the MP features available in MP v.2.0 Firebird and are referenced in Appendix G. 
The behavior models follow the UAS HADR mission narratives in Appendix G section 1. 
All models when run for scopes 1 or 2 on the Firebird provide an exhaustive set of use cases, or 
scenarios, for browsing and exploration. 
Behaviors specified in MP models include both regular (or “normal” scenarios), and “irregular” (or 
abnormal, like Approaching_Bingo_Fuel) scenarios. 
The .mp models are text files that may be downloaded from the project website at 
http://www.sercuarc.org/projects/verification-and-validation-vv-of-system-behavior-specifications/.  
They can be run by following the steps below: 
1. Go to http://firebird.nps.edu 
2. Use the Import menu to “Load .mp or .wng file” by clicking on the Choose File button 
3. Select the downloaded .mp model you are interested in browsing 
4. Click Open and the model will load into the text window on the left.  Use the Run button and 
Scope slider at the top left to browse traces from the model on the right. 
F.1.  UAV INGRESS PHASE  
UAV_Phase1_MA.mp 
Demonstrates basic MP event grammar rules: sequence, alternative, simple coordination with ADD 
commands. 
F.2.  UAV ON STATION PHASE  
UAV_Phase2_MA.mp 
Demonstrates iteration, coordination of events within iteration, simple conditional operation and MARK 
command. 
F.3.  UAV EGRESS PHASE  
UAV_Phase3_MA.mp 
Event set pattern (concurrency), optional event patterns, conditional coordination, SHARE ALL 
coordination, simple SAY clause. 
F.4.  UAV POST FLIGHT PHASE  
UAV_Phase4_MA.mp 
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APPENDIX G: MODEL BASED V&V (MCSE MPT) DEMONSTRATION  
 
This appendix provides a preliminary demonstration of the methodology introduced in Appendix 
D.  Since the methodology is a doctoral work in progress, this demonstration utilizes the first three 
steps, and then provides an example and discussion of how unexpected emergent behavior may present 
in Monterey Phoenix (MP) models.  For the purposes of this model-based V&V demonstration, a US 
Navy Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operational context is used to model the 
employment of an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS).  The HADR mission, authored by NPS students with 
operational and aviation experience, is first presented in the form of a Design Reference Mission (DRM) 
to define the operational context and behavior narratives, aligning with Step 1 in Appendix D.  Next, we 
show how to dissect the written Ingress Phase mission narrative into distinct actors and activities for 
composing MP grammar rules, consistent with Step 2.  We then show how to define coordination for the 
events in each actor’s grammar rule, as described in Step 3.  An example of an early version of the 
Ingress model is next presented to demonstrate the discovery of errors including an analysis of 
unexpected emergent behavior.  The appendix concludes with a summary of MP modeling heuristics, 
and common modeling errors to avoid. 
 
G.1.  COMPOSING A DRM TO FRAME A PROBLEM 
The Design Reference Mission (DRM) defines the projected threat and operating 
environment baseline for a rigorous systems engineering process to help ensure that 
future Navy systems can meet 21st century challenges and uncertainties (Skolnick 
and Wilkins, 2000). 
 
Design Reference Missions (DRMs) provide an initial operational context description which provides 
context and acts as a guide when instantiating systems.  System operators, stakeholders and 
technological subject matter experts (SMEs) provide input which shapes the primary capability need, a 
description of the proposed system and its boundaries (operational concept), and aids in understanding 
the projected operating environment in which mission functions take place.  As such, a DRM provides a 
meaningful system concept which provides a basis for further Systems Engineering (SE) work.  Taking 
the time to frame a problem well is the first and most critical step in successful system architecture and 
design (Giammarco & Shebalin, 2016). 
The DRM provides a common framework to link the SE efforts to stakeholder needs and provides an 
analytic basis for further comparison between instantiated systems meeting the stakeholder needs 
(Skolnick & Wilkins, 2000).  Error! Reference source not found. below shows the DRMs location and i








Figure G.1 - DRM in the SE Process (Skolnick & Wilkins, 2000) 
 
A DRM also supports project planning and synchronization by establishing a common reference for 
definitions, description of the demonstration environment and objectives, and expectations on 
measuring success.  Preliminary models of the pursued system design is outlined, however it only 
intends to establish a draft blueprint that will be refined during project execution. 
Architecture design and  analysis is an iterative, nonlinear process that unfolds based on information as 
it becomes available.  This project is exploratory project by nature; this DRM is expected to mature as 
more stakeholder inputs are received and integrated, and is not intended to represent an 
allencompassing specification of requirements etched in stone.  The objective here is to acknowledge 
that the use of UASs in HADR is an evolving concept; the DRM intends only to put forward an initial 
understanding of the problem space for solution providers and stakeholders.  Solution providers can 
refer to the DRM to understand expectations and manage requirements.  Additionally stakeholders may 
utilize the DRM to aid decision making concerns regarding candidate operational and solution 
architectures. 
The remaining subsections of G.1 contain a version of work authored by LCDR Christopher Krukowski and 
CDR Kathleen Giles entitled “Design Reference Mission for Unmanned Aircraft System Conducting 
Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief Mission,” a student project from the SI4022 System Architecture 
course taught at the Naval Postgraduate School , Monterey, CA, June 2017. 
 
G.1.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Krukowski and Giles sought to outline a DRM for a UAS in the participation of an HADR operation.  The 
DRM seeks to validate potential solutions and provide a basis for the development of a concept of 
operations (CONOPS) and system design for UAS support during a HADR mission (2017).  The language 
was kept as solution neutral as possible to allow for varied potential concept generation.  The main 
questions this DRM is looking to answer are: 
 
 
Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
74 
 
 Can a UAS support a HADR mission? 
 What role will a UAS play in supporting a HADR mission? 
 How effective will the UAS be in its support of a HADR mission? 
The scenario in this DRM will focus on the support provided by the UAS during the aftermath of an 
earthquake in a foreign country.  From this basic scenario, communication and coordination tactics can 
be explored to influence the UAS architecture. Additional scenario variations will provide basis for 
follow-on analysis from the use cases generated. 
G.1.1.1.  Mission Background 
HADR is one of the seven core mission of the United States Navy as outlined in the 2015 National 
Maritime Strategy.  Falling within the essential functional area of power projection, the HADR mission 
allows the Navy to project what is described as “smart power” ashore (USN, 2015).  Humanitarian 
assistance mission are conducted in response to foreign disasters either natural such as earthquakes, 
droughts, or floods, or man-made such as riots, civil strife, or epidemics (JCS, 2014).   Recent examples 
of the Navy employing this “smart power” projection include post-earthquake in Haiti in 2010, post-
tsunami in Japan in 2011, and post-typhoon in the Philippines in 2013 (USN, 2015).  With forces forward 
deployed throughout the world, the Navy is able to respond very rapidly and provide relief without the 
benefit of shore-based facilities.  Navy assets provide a Joint Force Commander with a unique set of 
capabilities including medical facilities, search and rescue, and reconnaissance capability (USN, 2015).  
During the 2010 Haiti earthquake relief, remote sensing data, such as the aerial imagery collected and 
disseminated by a UAS, were effectively used to assess the degree of landslides, the extent of blocked 
roadways, infrastructure damage assessment, and guiding search and rescue (SAR) teams (Eberhard, 
2010).  By comparing data gathered during remote sensing missions to previous data, mission 
coordinators can develop rescue plans to focus their efforts on the hardest hit areas after a disaster.  
Natural disasters can also leave an affected area’s communication infrastructures in pieces after an 
incident, and there is often a need to establish impromptu communication networks to enable effective 
communication between the multiple entities participating in the disaster relief operation.  U.S. Navy 
assets are typically employed in HADR mission within close proximity to the shoreline, however, with 
approximately 40% of the world’s population living within 100 km of the ocean; the Navy expects its role 
in HADR missions to remain substantial (United Nations, 2017). 
G.1.1.2.  Operational Concept 
Although the U.S. Military might be the first on scene due to the forward deployed aspect of military 
forces around the world, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or 
Department of State (DOS) normally lead HADR activities (JCS, 2014) (NWDC, 2006).  It is the role of the 
US ambassador to the country in need of support to manage the relationship with the host nation (HN) 
(NWDC, 2006).  Military support is requested by the Department of State and then orders are passed 
along to the regional combatant commander.  The regional combatant commander will then organize 
and coordinate the appropriate joint task force (NWDC, 2006).  For situations involving an multinational 
response, the lead agency is typically the United Nations. 
There are many different operational models for HADR missions. Civilian agencies typically simplify 
HADR into three phases: preparation, immediate response and reconstruction (Kovacs & Spens 2007) 
while the military uses the joint operational planning processes such as those found in JP 3-29 Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning and TACMEMO 3-07.6-06 Foreign 
Humanitarian / Disaster Relief Operations Planning.  
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The military planning process typically follows the joint operational planning process (JOPP).  This 
process normally will follow seven specific steps: 
1. Initiation 
2. Mission Analysis 
3. Course of Action (COA) Development 
4. COA Analysis and Wargaming 
5. COA Comparison 
6. COA Approval 
7. Plan or Order Development (JCS, 2011) 
HADR is unique in that there is limited time between notification and execution, and the location where 
a HADR mission will occur is not known until the disaster strikes.  This does not make the planning 
process any less important, though.  Military planners develop generic HADR plans that can be put in 
place in the event of a disaster, but until the disaster occurs, specific environment and circumstances 
are not known.  During the planning phase, the HN, USAID, other US government agencies, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and inter-government agencies (IGOs) conduct needs assessments 
to determine the capability of each participating agency.  The relief system and mission statement are 
developed based on the required support needed, within the context of the operational environment.  
Once the relief system has been established, the joint force structure is developed to provide 
coordination and communication processes between agencies (JCS, 2014). 
The execution and assessment phase begins with deployment, which includes joint reception, staging, 
onward movement and integration (JCS, 2014). Once the forces are in place, command and control (C2) 
and sustainment operations bring communication, transportation, and logistics support to the HN.  
Intelligence and information gathering and dissemination help the appropriate relief agency prioritize 
requests for aid and deliver supplies.  Finally, assessment is conducted throughout the operation and is a 
key component for a smooth transition of control back to the HN and NGOs at the appropriate time.  
The expected duration of a HADR mission can vary widely.  The relief efforts for the Indian Ocean 
tsunami, Hurricane Katrina and the Haitian earthquake lasted 81, 42 and 72 days respectively; however, 
the USN part of the mission was completed in 41, 38, and 41 days respectively (Greenfield, 2011). In 
those three examples, NGOs and the HN were able to take over the relief effort after the immediate 
response and stabilization efforts made by USN assets in the initial five to six weeks.   
This DRM will focus on the immediate response phase, and the following assets, representative of assets 
that would be found in an amphibious ready group (ARG) may be used in the scenario present in this 
DRM: 
 US Navy ships: 
o LHD (landing helicopter dock) amphibious assault ship – with medical support, CH-
53 and MH-60 variants for transport, lift, and SAR, and LCAC for ship-to-shore supply 
delivery 
o LHA (landing helicopter assault) amphibious assault ship - with medical support, CH-
53, MH-60 variants, and MV-22 for transport, lift. 
o LPD (landing ship dock) amphibious assault ship – with medical support, launch and 
land capability for CH-53, and MH-60 variants supporting transport, lift, and SAR, 
and LCAC for ship-to-shore supply delivery 
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 JTF C2 – Joint Task Force Command and Control node: tactical air control squadron 
(TACRON), joint force air component commander (JFACC), or other JTF asset who will be 
providing air traffic control. Responsible for coordination between military and NGO assets.  
 Helicopters – MH-60 variants and CH-53, for SAR and transport of ship-to-shore personnel 
and supplies. 
 UAS – consists of a Group 3 UAV launched from the deck of an LHD, LHA, LPD, or shore 
facility, a ground control station (GCS), launch and recovery systems.  Group 3 UAVs have a 
maximum gross take-off weight of less than 1,320 lbs. and operate at medium altitudes with 
medium to long range and endurance (Navy 2008).  Potential Payloads may include:  
o Streaming infrared (IR), video for detecting, classifying and identifying targets in the 
IR spectrum during wide-area, day or night search 
o Streaming electro-optic (EO) video for detecting, classifying, and identifying targets 
in the visible light spectrum during wide-area, day-time search in clear atmosphere 
o Synthetic aperture radar for all-weather detection and classification of stationary 
objects, and for determining the status of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and 
buildings. IR and EO sensors can be cross-cued to an initial synthetic aperture radar 
target detection.  
o Simultaneous voice relay and data-link communication over VHF, UHF, and military 
and commercial satellite  
While Military Sealift Command (MSC) cargo and hospital ships (T-AH) are useful in HADR missions for 
carrying large quantities of cargo and functioning as floating hospitals, they are not included as assets 
for this immediate response phase scenario.  MSC cargo ships are manned with small crews, and may 
not have embarked helicopters, limiting their SAR and other immediate response mission utility.  
Hospital ships are not kept in a ready status (medical personnel are pulled from Navy active duty 
hospital staff or from the Navy’s Reserve), which delays their arrival. 
 
G.1.2.  PROJECTED OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
The Projected Operating Environment (POE) is the environment in which the UAS is expected to operate. 
This section provides details that describe the environmental conditions, types of locations, and threats 
to which the system will be subject.  The POE establishes a context within which interactions and 
interfaces of the system may be modeled to produce measurable outcomes to enable physical 
architecture design tradeoffs (Whitcomb et al., 2015).  
G.1.2.1.  Environmental Conditions 
The HADR mission domain is the nation of Haiti, specifically the capital city of Port-au-Prince and the 
surrounding area.  The expected operating area is depicted in Figure G.2.  
 
 




Figure G.2 - Map of Port-au-Prince and surrounding area. Adapted from Google Maps (2017) 
 
The climate of Haiti is classified as a Tropical Wet climate on the Köppen Climate Classification Scale 
(Climate-data.org, 2017) (Wikipedia, 2017).  This means the UAS should expect to operate under the 
following environmental climate conditions (Climate-data.org. 2017): 
 Temperature:  
o 65 – 95 degrees Fahrenheit 
o Average: 80 degrees Fahrenheit 
 Precipitation: 
o 1.6 – 9.6 inches of rain per month 
o Wind gusts less than 20 kts 
In addition to the climatic environment, the operating environment for the UAS is defined as: 
 Daytime, visual meteorological conditions  
 Maximum operating altitude: <18K’ MSL  
 Mountainous terrain - Highest peak: Pic la Selle (8,793 ft)  
 
G.1.2.2.  Threat Details 
G.1.2.2.1.  Assumed Threat Environment 
The UAS is expected to operate in a permissive environment.  The only threats to the success of the 
HADR UAS mission are expected to come from convective weather, mountainous terrain, and 
unintentional electromagnetic interference.  Threats from human actors, groups, or governments are 
not considered in this DRM.   
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G.1.2.2.2.  Assumed Threat Mitigation 
A mobile weather station on board the host platform (LHD, LHA, or LPD) will be used to monitor 
weather conditions and flights will not be conducted in or around convective weather.  If a mission is 
airborne and convective weather develops, consideration should be given to returning the UAV to base. 
The terrain to the north and south of Port-au-Prince is mountainous, with the highest peak being Pic la 
Selle at 8,793 feet.  The threat from the mountainous terrain will be mitigated through proper mission 
planning on the part of the GCS Operator. 
The potential UAS is expected to operate in the vicinity of both a rural and urban environment.  To 
mitigate the potential problem of unintentional electromagnetic interference, the GCS Operator will 
need to ensure proper mission planning is conducted to coordinate frequency separation in an effort to 
minimize interference with other assets assisting in the HADR mission. 
G.1.3.  MISSION AND MEASURES 
G.1.3.1.  Mission success Requirements 
In order for the mission to be successful, the UAS under consideration must meet the following high-
level requirements:  
 Embark on and operate from U. S.  Navy ships (LPD-19, LHD–5, LHA–6, or LHA-8 class), 
or embark on a U.S. Navy ship and disembark from a U.S. Navy ship at operational 
location, and operate from an unprepared shore location 
 Collect and disseminate imagery data to military and civilian units to improve timeliness 
of humanitarian need prioritization, and decrease response time to deliver relief 
supplies or conduct search and rescue operations 
 Provide communication relay to other military and civilian units in order to improve 
information dissemination among participating units, and decrease response time to 
deliver relief supplies 
G.1.3.2.  Mission Definition 
The main reference mission provides a level of detail necessary for collecting measures to assess mission 
success requirements.  As technology and tactics develop, additional mission variations will be added to 
allow for increased aircraft, incorporation of sensors and weapons, different tactics, other unmanned or 
manned assets, and different environmental conditions. The capability needs statement for the main 
UAS HADR mission is:  
 
The US Navy needs a cost-effective means to rapidly conduct reconnaissance, and 
support network centric communication to support immediate response to HADR 
missions, freeing crews to conduct other necessary missions. 
 
The main mission will have an operational situation (OPSIT) that describes the assumptions being made 
about the mission’s operational environment, which have implications for logistics, deployment, and 
time required to complete the mission. The simulation results for the OPSIT influence the design, and 
may provide test cases for future Developmental or Operational Test & Evaluation (DT&E or OT&E) 
(Skolnick & Willkins, 2000).  Two similar OPSITs are presented in this DRM; ship based and shore based. 
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The following OPSITs pertains to a US Navy HADR task force supporting the Government of Haiti (GOH).  
Both OPSITs are fictional scenarios, based on the cataclysmic magnitude 7.0 earthquake which occurred 
on 12 January 2010.  In these scenarios, Haiti will sustain a magnitude 6.8 earthquake on 15 January 
2018, at 1603 EST. Over the following 5 days, more than 10 aftershocks greater than magnitude 3.5 will 
be recorded. In order to increase the effectiveness of this mission, the GOH and USAID have requested 
the assistance of the US Navy to provide relief in the form of medical support, temporary 
communication infrastructure, airborne reconnaissance, SAR, relief supply delivery, and berthing 
capacity for an expected 40-day period. 
G.1.3.2.1.  Ship-Based OPSIT 
The primary mission for the UAS is to provide remote sensing data in order to assist infrastructure 
damage assessment and to guide SAR operations.  The UAS will deploy as part of an amphibious ready 
group (ARG) onboard an LPD class ship.  Once the ARG is on scene, the UAS launches from the LPD when 
tasked, and establishes communication with the JTF C2 node.  The UAS proceeds with the briefed 
tasking and target deck, but may receive in-flight re-tasking based on the dynamics of the relief effort.  
The remote sensing data, imagery, and target positions will be provided to other assets assisting the 
HADR mission via common data link and Link-16.  A secondary mission is for the UAS to act as an interim 
airborne communications relay node over the area of operation until more permanent communications 
can be established. The primary requirement will be relaying UHF and VHF voice and data 
communications between geographically separated ground elements that cannot establish direct line-
of-sight communications. Once the UAS reaches bingo fuel or mission conclusion is commanded, it 
egresses to the host platform, where it is recovered.  
G.1.3.2.2.  Shore-Based OPSIT 
Similar to the ship-based OPSIT, the primary mission of the UAS will be to deploy with an ARG to provide 
remote sensing data in order to assist infrastructure damage assessment and to guide SAR operations.  
Upon arrival on scene, the UAS will disembark from the host platform and set up operation ashore at an 
unprepared location.  From a shore-based location, the UAS will complete all the same tasking as 
detailed in the ship-based OPSIT.  At the conclusion of the ARG’s HADR mission support, the UAS will re-
embark on the host platform to return to base. 
 
G.1.3.3.  Mission Execution 
The following mission narrative describes a general UAS HADR aerial reconnaissance reference mission.  
This mission narrative can be applied to both the ship-based and shore-based OPSITs detailed above. 
Mission start time (T+00) occurs at the beginning of the staging phase.  The mission will be composed of 
the following phases: staging, mission planning, preflight, ingress, on-station, egress, and postflight.  The 
staging and mission-planning phase need not occur immediately preceding the remaining phases and 
may have a significant time separation from the preflight, ingress, on-station, egress, and postflight 
stage.  For subsequent HADR missions, the staging phase may not be required if conducting the mission 
from the same location.  The system will enact an operational failsafe mode if a system error (such as 
loss of command and control information or loss of GPS signal) occurs. Two parties will operate the UAS:  
1. The GCS Operator, who is in charge of operating the GCS, controlling the UAV while 
airborne, and coordinating with external units  








G.1.3.3.1.  UAS HADR Mission Narrative for Aerial Reconnaissance Mission 
G.1.3.3.1.1.  Staging Phase: 
Pre-Conditions: Staging phase begins once the UAS in its travel configuration arrives at the 
designated deployment site (ground or shipboard) 
 
 Ground Crew unpack and assemble UAS from its travel configuration  
 GCS Operator and Ground Crew configure system in preparation for executing a 
flight mission upon receipt of orders 
 GCS Operator and Ground Crew test  UAS to ensure an operational status 
 If UAS is not in an operational status, Ground Crew conducts maintenance to get 
them to an operational status 
 Ground Crew reports all components in an operational status to the GCS Operator 
 GCS Operator ensure GCS has up-to-date digital charts 
 If the GCS does not have up-to-date charts, the GCS Operator uploads up-to-date 
charts to the GCS 
 GCS Operator establishes communications with the JTF C2 
 
Post-Conditions: Staging phase ends when the UAS has been assembled, components tested, 
communications established, and the crew is ready to receive and execute missions 
 
G.1.3.3.1.2.  Mission Planning Phase: 
Pre-Conditions: The Mission Planning Phase begins when the GCS Operator receives a tasking order 
to be prepared to execute an aerial reconnaissance mission 
 
 GCS Operator reviews air tasking order (ATO), special instructions (SPINS), and any 
other relevant operational tasking orders (OPTASKS) from the JTF C2. These 
documents contain aircraft callsigns, mission types, coordination frequencies, 
airspace boundaries, ingress/egress corridors, failsafe rally waypoints and other 
relevant mission information. 
 GCS Operator checks weather 
 GCS Operator powers on GCS 
 If there are any changes to the communication frequencies, the GCS Operator 
updates any communication frequencies  
 If any there are any changes from previous digital chart configurations, the GCS 
Operator updates the digital charts on the GCS 
 GCS Operator plans ingress and egress routes to and from the reconnaissance area, 
on-station waypoint, recovery waypoint, and failsafe rally waypoint 
 GCS Operator plans search pattern to cover assigned tasking order 
 GCS Operator downloads mission plan from GCS, provides mission plan to Ground 
Crew, and Ground Crew uploads mission plan to UAV 
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 If UAV launch is not imminent, GCS Operator powers off the GCS 
 GCS Operator reviews data collection plan 
 GCS Operator and Ground Crew conduct mission brief 
 
Post-Conditions: Mission Planning Phase ends following completion of the mission brief 
 
G.1.3.3.1.3.  Preflight Phase: 
Pre-Conditions: Preflight phase begins when UAS is powered on for launch 
 
 Ground Crew powers on the launcher 
 Ground Crew positions the launcher into the wind 
 Ground Crew performs the dry launch checkout 
 Ground Crew installs data storage devices in UAV 
 GCS Operator installs data storage devices in GCS 
 Ground Crew loads UAV on launcher 
 If the GCS is not already powered on, the GCS Operator powers on the GCS 
 GCS Operator verifies correct mission plan is loaded in the GCS 
 If incorrect plan is loaded, GCS Operator loads correct plan into GCS 
 Ground Crew powers on the UAV 
 Ground Crew conducts engine run up 
 Ground Crew verifies the correct mission plan is loaded in the UAV 
 If incorrect mission plan is loaded into UAV, GCS Operator downloads correct plan 
from GCS, provides the plan to the Ground Crew, and Ground Crew uploads correct 
plan to UAV 
 GCS Operator verifies connectivity with the UAV 
 GCS Operator ensures GCS and UAV have synced mission plans 
 If shipboard, GCS Operator establishes communications with host ship 
 GCS Operator establishes communications with JTF C2 
 UAV reports all systems flight ready to the GCS Operator 
 GCS Operator verifies UAV system is in a flight ready status 
 If UAV is not in a flight ready status, Ground Crew performs maintenance on the 
UAV and reports when maintenance is complete to the GCS Operator 
 
Post-Conditions: Preflight phase ends when the UAS is in flight ready status 
 
G.1.3.3.1.4.  Ingress Phase: 
Pre-Conditions: Ingress Phase begins when the GCS Operator receives a launch clearance from the 
JTF C2 
 
 GCS Operator receives launch command from JTF C2 
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 If shipboard, the GCS Operator requests host ship maneuver to achieve launch 
parameters 
 GCS Operator checks launch parameters for safety 
 GCS Operator receives launch clearance from host platform 
 GCS Operator commands Ground Crew to launch UAV 
 Ground Crew commands UAV to launch 
 UAV launches  
 UAV maneuvers to clear obstacles then maneuvers to reach ingress altitude 
 UAV levels off at ingress altitude 
 UAV transmits status (payload and systems) and position messages to GCS Operator 
(on-going throughout each phase of mission) 
 If status and position are acceptable, GCS Operator commands UAV to proceed on 
ingress flight path, otherwise the GCS Operator commands UAV to return to base.  
Proceed to egress phase. 
 UAV follows ingress flight path to reach on-station area and altitude 
 GCS Operator monitors UAV status and position during flight path to on-station area 
and altitude 
 The UAV reaches initial on-station waypoint and reports position to GCS Operator 
 
Post-Conditions: The Ingress Phase ends when the UAV reaches the initial on-station waypoint 
 
G.1.3.3.1.5.  On-station Phase: 
Pre-Conditions: The On-station phase begins when the UAV reaches the assigned on-station area 
 
 UAV reports arrival at on-station waypoint to the GCS Operator 
 GCS Operator verifies correct position 
 GCS Operator checks payload status 
 If at the correct position and payload status is still good, the GCS Operator 
commands UAV to commence on-station tasking.  If not the GCS Operator 
commands the UAV to return to base.  Proceed to Egress Phase. 
 GCS Operator establishes communication with Other Assets 
 UAV conducts on-station tasking 
 
G.1.3.3.1.5.1.  Conduct Aerial Reconnaissance 
 GCS Operator reports commencement of aerial reconnaissance to JTF C2 and Other 
Assets  
 UAV collects data on assigned search area 
 UAV transmits data to GCS Operator, JTF C2, and Other Assets.  Ongoing throughout 
the aerial reconnaissance mission 
 JTF C2, and Other Assets assess UAV-provided data.  If they determine a SAR mission 
is required, they communicate with GCS Operator.  
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 If SAR mission is required, the GCS Operator commands the UAV to deviate from 
assigned flight path, transit to, and orbit over SAR area. 
 If the GCS Operator receives request from Other Assets or JTF C2 to set up a 
communications relay node 
o Then GCS Operator configures UAV for communications relay 
o Then UAV performs communication relay for JTF C2 and Other Assets 
 Concurrent with the Aerial Reconnaissance Mission, GCS Operator monitors UAS 
provided system health, UAV flight path, and fuel load 
 
Post-Conditions: The On-station phase ends when UAV reaches bingo fuel, the on-station time 
period has concluded, or the JTF C2 has commanded the GCS Operator to return the UAV to base 
 
G.1.3.3.1.6.  Egress Phase:  
Pre-Conditions: The egress phase begins when egress criteria have been met or the GCS Operator 
commands a return to base and the UAV is on a flight path to return to base (or ship) 
 
 GCS Operator commands UAV to commence egress 
 GCS Operator monitors system health  
 GCS Operator monitors egress flight path 
 Ground Crew prepares recovery device for recovery 
 UAV reports arrival at recovery way point 
 GCS Operator checks recovery parameters 
 If shipboard and recovery parameters are unacceptable, the GCS Operator requests 
host platform maneuver to achieve safe recovery parameters 
 GCS Operator executes auto-land or manual landing 
 If auto-landing, UAV executes recovery profile 
 If manual landing, the GCS Operator controls the UAV on recovery profile 
 If recovery profile exceeds safety parameters, UAV executes autonomous wave-off 
 GCS Operator monitors recovery profile 
 If recovery profile exceeds safety parameters and UAV has not executed 
autonomous wave-off, the GCS Operator executes a wave-off 
 If the UAV has waved-off, the GCS Operator maneuvers the UAV to intercept 
recovery waypoint again 
 If no wave-off has occurred, UAV executes recovery 
 If the UAV is unable to land and bingo fuel is approaching, the GCS Operator will 
command the UAV to proceed to an alternate landing site if available.  If 
unavailable, the GCS Operator will intentionally ditch the aircraft 
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G.1.3.3.1.7.  Postflight Phase: 
Pre-Conditions: Postflight begins after UAV is recovered 
 Ground Crew conducts UAS post-flight checks and services  
 Ground Crew assesses UAV and launch and recovery devices (as applicable) for 
damage 
 Ground Crew removes data storage devices from UAV 
 Ground Crew power off UAV and launch and recovery devices 
 GCS Operators remove data storage device from GCS 
 GCS Operators power off GCS 
 GCS Operator and Ground Crew debrief mission 
 GCS Operator and Ground Crew generate after-action report 
 GCS Operator transmits after action report and applicable data from data storage to 
JTF C2, HN, NGOs, or Other Assets 
Post-Conditions: The postflight phase ends once the mission after action report has been completed 
and transmitted 
 
G.1.3.3.1.8.  Failsafe Mode:  
The failsafe mode is triggered during any flight phase (Ingress, On-station, or Egress) when either 
communications with the GCS are lost, when GPS navigation is lost, or both. 
 
 If command and control communication is lost between the UAV and GCS for more 
than 1 minute: the UAV flies to operator-specified failsafe rally waypoint, and orbits 
until communication is reestablished.  If communication not reestablished within 5 
minutes, UAV conducts auto-land near failsafe rally waypoint. 
 If loss of GPS occurs, UAV orbits at constant altitude to reestablish a GPS link. If GPS 
does not return after 1 min, UAV dead reckons to rally waypoint and conducts an 
auto-land.  
 GCS Operator may command a UAV destruction at any time for safety of flight 
reasons or to prevent enemy from capturing system. 
 
The failsafe mode ends when any one of the following occurs:  
 Command and Control Communications are reestablished  
 GPS navigation becomes available 
 The UAV has completed an auto-land 
 The UAV has been command-detonated for safety or to prevent capture. 
 
G.1.3.4.  Measures 
This DRM is designed to provide the necessary context for a system under development to assess 
current system capabilities and tactics. Notional key system characteristics include interoperability, 
reliability, and maintainability. The following measures from the Universal Joint Task List and Universal 
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Naval Task List (JEL+, 2017; DOD, 2008), may be useful for evaluating the effectiveness of the system for 
meeting mission requirements:  
 
OP 2.7.1 Manage Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): “Direct, supervise, and guide 
operational control (OPCON) of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations 
supporting the joint force.   Intelligence support to operations may be derived from any number and 
variety of intelligence sources and sensors employed within the operational environment (OE). Full-
motion video (FMV) and motion imagery provided by unmanned and manned assets are two examples 
that may contribute to mission effectiveness of ISR operations. Maintaining cognizance of the 
availability and capabilities of all sources and sensors employed within the OE, coincidental to ISR 
operations, and ensuring timely dissemination of collected information in order to affect operational 
decision-making are essential elements of this task. Implement the ISR CONOPS based on the collection 
strategy and ISR execution planning. Coordinate ISR operations with the joint force directorate, 
intelligence plans section, joint force collection manager, and asset controlling authority to ensure ISR 
operations are executed in accordance with the intelligence collection strategy” (JEL+, 2017). 
M1 Percent Of unanalyzed information made available to support personnel recovery. 
M2 Percent Of unanalyzed information made available to support time-sensitive targeting. 
M3 Percent Of unanalyzed information made available to joint task force commander for time-critical 
decision-making. 
M4 Percent Of unanalyzed information made available to joint intelligence support element analysts for 
production of current intelligence. 
M5 Minutes For FMV asset to establish communications with higher headquarters. 
M6 Hours To identify shortfalls in reconnaissance platforms. 
M7 Minutes To coordinate redirection of ISR assets to meet new collection requirement. 
M8 Minutes To coordinate redirection of ISR assets to meet combatant commander or national collection 
requirement. 
 
Measure detailed in the Joint Universal Task List to support Task OP 2.7.1 are written specifically to 
gathering ISR data during a combat engagement, however many of the measures would apply even if 
not in a combat situation.  The above measures have been modified to remove reference to the combat 
situations. 
 
OP 8.10 Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: “Relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, 
hunger, or privation outside the United States and its territories.  This task may include surveying the 
disaster area, prioritizing needs, conducting health assessments, and providing health services, 
communications, shelter, subsistence, water, engineering support, transportation, firefighting, mass 
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M1 Percent Of affected area under control of legitimate authorities 
M2 Percent Of populace that has basic needs met within 24 hours after disaster/incident 
 
OP 8.18 Coordinate with NGOs: “NGOs operate in most conflict areas, areas of instability, and under-
governed territory. Cooperation with NGOs can improve Joint Force effectiveness and minimize conflict 
between the DoD and NGO” (JEL+, 2017). 
M1 Number Of formal contacts with relevant NGOs. 
 
NTA 1.1.2.5 Employ Remote Vehicles: “To operate vehicles such as robots, drones, unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other devices from a local control 
station. This task includes deployment, launch, control, and recovery operations” (DOD, 2008).  
M1 Hours To respond to emergent tasking 
M2 Percent Of mission time controller remains in communication with remote vehicle 
M3 Number/day Of remote vehicle missions conducted successfully 
 
NTA 1.2.8.2 Conduct Helicopter Landing Zone Reconnaissance: “To confirm historical data through on-
site reconnaissance of a proposed helicopter landing zone (HLZ), site, or point” (DOD, 2008).  
M1 Time Force delayed due to late reconnaissance 
M2 Number HLZ’s confirmed 
M3 Time Force delayed due to inadequate reconnaissance 
 
NTA 2.2.3 Perform Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance: “To obtain, by various detection 
methods, information about the activities of an enemy or potential enemy or tactical area of operations. 
This task uses surveillance to systematically observe the area of operations by visual, aural, electronic, 
photographic, or other means. This includes development and execution of search plans” (DOD, 2008).  
M1 Days From receipt of tasking, unit reconnaissance/surveillance assets in place. 
M2 Percent Of collection requirements fulfilled by reconnaissance/surveillance assets. 
M3 Percent Of time able to respond to collection requirements. 
 
NTA 2.2.3.1 Search Assigned Area: “To conduct a search/localization plan utilizing ordered search 
modes/arcs” (DOD, 2008).  
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M1 Hours From receipt of tasking until search force is in place. 
M2 Hours To respond to emergent tasking(s). 
M3 Percent Of time able to respond to collection requirements. 
 
NTA 4.8.3 Provide Interagency Coordination: “To coordinate all civil affairs with the appropriate U.S. 
agencies and follow their direction as appropriate” (DOD, 2008).  
M1 Number Of incidents/situations requiring coordination 
M2 Hours To assess situation and define assistance needed 
M3 Number Incidents of failed/ineffective coordination 
 
NTA 4.8.4 Coordinate with Non-Governmental Organizations: “To coordinate civil affairs with 
appropriate NGOs, including private voluntary organizations” (DOD, 2008).  
M1 Number Of incidents/situations requiring coordination 
M2 Hours To assess situation and define assistance needed 
M3 Number Incidents of failed/ineffective coordination 
 
NTA 5.1.1.1.2.2 Relay Communications: “To pass information which cannot reach its targeted audience 
directly.  This includes the use of aircraft for tactical relay” (DOD, 2008).    
M1 Number Messages relayed. 
M2 Minutes To relay required messages. 
M3 Percent Correct messages received. 
 
Other potential mission measures include: number of sorties, pounds of provisions delivered, number of 
survivors located, number of people evacuated, and number of damaged facilities identified.   
G.1.4.  CONCLUSION 
G.1.4.1.  DRM Analysis and future recommendations 
This DRM has been developed to support answering three questions: 
 Can a UAS support a HADR mission? 
 What role will a UAS play in supporting a HADR mission? 
 How effective will the UAS be in its support of a HADR mission? 
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Further analysis based on this DRM is recommended to simulate the mission narrative as written, and 
determine any emergent behaviors of the system. 
G.1.4.2.  Summary 
This DRM has established: 
 An operational context, description of the environment and situations in which a 
system of interest is expected to operate 
 An operational narrative containing enough detail to generate multiple operational 
scenarios 
 A sequence of operational activities and interactions between the key system 
elements and other systems in the environment 
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G.2.  EXTRACTING MP BEHAVIOR MODELS FROM MISSION NARRATIVES 
Monterey Phoenix (MP) is a framework for software system architecture and business process 
(workflow) specification based on behavior models.  MP is intended for the use of lightweight formal 
methods in software and system architecture design and maintenance.  It provides an ecosystem for 
consistency checking tools, reusable architecture patterns, reusable assertions, queries, and tools for 
extracting architecture views. 
In this section, we show an example of how to formalize a natural language behavior narrative 
consistent with Step 2 in Appendix D.   First, the Ingress Phase is selected to scope the demonstration.   
Actors are next extracted from the narrative, followed by the action each performs.  Finally, the MP 
grammar rules are composed for the Ingress mission narrative. 
G.2.1.  SCOPE THE MODELING TASK 
The HADR mission narrative presented in section G.1 consists of eight stages or phases.  Not all source 
documents are as well prepared, however, and if the narrative is lengthy, it is advisable to partition it 
into segments like mission phases that can be modeled independently, at least initially.  Segmenting 
behavior narratives for modeling enables the developer to focus attention on one part of the problem at 
a time, developing, verifying and validating (V&V) small models before composing them into larger 
models for further V&V.  For the purposes of this demonstration, the Ingress Phase (reprinted here for 
convenience) is used to illustrate each step.    
 
Ingress Phase 
Pre-Conditions: Ingress Phase begins when the GCS Operator receives a launch clearance from the JTF 
C2 
 GCS Operator receives launch command from JTF C2 
 GCS Operator checks launch parameters for safety 
 GCS Operator receives launch clearance from host platform 
 GCS Operator commands Ground Crew to launch UAV 
 Ground Crew commands UAV to launch 
 UAV launches  
 UAV maneuvers to clear obstacles then maneuvers to reach ingress altitude 
 UAV levels off at ingress altitude 
 UAV transmits status (payload and systems) and position messages to GCS Operator 
(on-going throughout each phase of mission) 
 If status and position are acceptable, GCS Operator commands UAV to proceed on 
ingress flight path, otherwise the GCS Operator commands UAV to return to base.  
Proceed to egress phase. 
 UAV follows ingress flight path to reach on-station area and altitude 
 GCS Operator monitors UAV status and position during flight path to on-station area 
and altitude 
 The UAV reaches initial on-station waypoint and reports position to GCS Operator 
Post-Conditions: The Ingress Phase ends when the UAV reaches the initial on-station waypoint 
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G.2.2.  IDENTIFY THE ACTORS  
The narrative contains clear identifiers for the required actors in their Ingress Phase steps.  If 
inconsistent abbreviations, different spellings, or different names altogether had been used to describe 
these actors, it would have been more difficult for the modeler to discern the actors in play.  We 
highlight relevant actors in the reprinted narrative in green, to help with the extraction process. Figure 
G.3 shows the actors that were extracted from the narrative, plus one more – Environment – which was 
not explicitly referenced in the narrative, but it is needed to provide a navigation reference (e.g., from 
the Global Positioning System). The actors GCS Operator, JTF C2, Ground Crew, UAV, and Environment 
are all needed to originate or receive commands, information, and other items described in the 
narrative.  We omit the ship actor for simplicity, since the ship only indirectly interacts with the UAV. 
 
Figure G.3.  Actors identified in the HADR Mission Ingress Phase 
 
Since we are starting a new MP model, we write some introductory comments: 
/********************************************************************* 
UAV HADR Mission 
 
The following model specifies the ingress phase of the UAS HADR 
reference mission.  
The ingress phase is preceded by the preflight phase, and followed by 
the on-station phase. 
   




We can now name the schema (MP model), and establish a root event for each actor.  The top to 
bottom order of the roots in the model corresponds with the left to right order in which they will be 
graphed in the output. 
SCHEMA UAV_Ingress 
 
ROOT JTF_C2:       ;  
ROOT GCS_Operator: ; 
ROOT Ground_Crew:  ; 
ROOT UAV:          ; 
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G.2.2.  IDENTIFY THE ACTIONS  
Returning now to the mission narrative, we can find the actions being performed by each of the actors.  
They are highlighted in blue in the narrative reprint below. 
Ingress Phase 
Pre-Conditions: Ingress Phase begins when the GCS Operator receives a launch clearance from the JTF 
C2 
 GCS Operator receives launch command from JTF C2 
 GCS Operator checks launch parameters for safety 
 GCS Operator receives launch clearance from host platform 
 GCS Operator commands Ground Crew to launch UAV 
 Ground Crew commands UAV to launch 
 UAV launches  
 UAV maneuvers to clear obstacles then maneuvers to reach ingress altitude 
 UAV levels off at ingress altitude 
 UAV transmits status (payload and systems) and position messages to GCS Operator 
(on-going throughout each phase of mission) 
 If status and position are acceptable, GCS Operator commands UAV to proceed on 
ingress flight path, otherwise the GCS Operator commands UAV to return to base.  
Proceed to egress phase. 
 UAV follows ingress flight path to reach on-station area and altitude 
 GCS Operator monitors UAV status and position during flight path to on-station area 
and altitude 
 The UAV reaches initial on-station waypoint and reports position to GCS Operator 
Post-Conditions: The Ingress Phase ends when the UAV reaches the initial on-station waypoint 
In order for the actors and actions to stand out so clearly in a written mission narrative, several revisions 
to the narrative are sometimes necessary.  In the best case, the model developer has a good working 
relationship with the narrative writer and both have the resources to refine the narrative.  In the worst 
case, the model developer does not have a direct line of communication with the mission narrative 
author or the narrative cannot be revised from its current form.  In this case, the best course of action 
for the model developer is to perform the extraction as best as able and document all assumptions.  
Figure G.4 illustrates a sample comment cycle provided by a model developer (Cody Reese, PD21-171 
student) on the mission narrative, early enough in its development that a narrative author (Chris 
Krukowski, PD21-171 student) was able to respond and refine the narrative.  The comment bubbles 
have examples of actual clarifying questions the modeler asked the mission narrative author at the very 
beginning of a modeling effort in their SI4022 System Architecture course.  The comments not only 
include questions about the narrative structure, but the modeler is also eliciting possible alternative 
scenarios, which is key to modeling a comprehensive set of use cases scenarios.  These are the types of 








Figure G.4.  The model developer marks an early draft of the mission narrative with questions for the 
narrative author to clarify.  
 
Besides the list of actions evident from the narrative, it is up to the modeler to ascertain the specific 
actions or states that take place.  In doing so, the modeler identifies any actions that may result in the 
exchange of additional energy, material, money, or information (EMMI) not explicitly modeled, such as 
‘JTF Provide Launch Command’ that initiates the Ingress Phase, or ‘Abort Mission’ that is one way in 
which the Ingress Phase may end.  The model developer also identifies actions that may follow (but not 
directly involve) the exchange of EMMI such as ‘Status Acceptable’ in which the GCS Operator makes a 
decision concerning information previously supplied by the UAV.  Table G.1 shows how the actions 
identified in the Ingress Phase narrative may appear as events in MP.  The underscore is used to 
separate words in the event name.  A note on event naming conventions:  normally a root event name 
does not need to be repeated in its composite or atomic event names; in this case they are because 
there are multiple instances of commands being passed between the roots. 
 
 










Status_acceptable  Level_off_at_ingress_altitude 
Command_UAV_to_proceed_on_ingress Transmit_status_and_position 







The actions may be directly transcribed into the MP grammar rules as shown in the code on the next 
page. As a best practice, as the model is modified, the comments are updated with the modifier name, 
date, and change notes.  Commenting throughout the model using /* … */ brackets is also a good 
practice for documenting assumptions or temporarily removing events as one debugs the model. 
The Ingress phase model is deliberately very simple, containing just one alternate path in the GCS 
Operator and the UAV.  Alternate events in each root are stacked on each side of the | symbol and 
enclosed in parenthesis to denote the range events to alternate. 
 
 




UAV HADR Mission 
 
The following model specifies the ingress phase of the UAS HADR reference 
mission.  
The ingress phase is preceded by the preflight phase, and followed by the on-
station phase. 
   
  created by K.Giammarco on 04-26-2017 (Template established) 
  modified by C.Reese on 06-10-2017 (added branch in the GCS operator model - 
status acceptable/unacceptable 
  modified by C.Reese on 06-11-2017 Added Environment provide / UAV receive 
navigation reference 




ROOT JTF_C2:      JTF_Provide_launch_command;  
/* Assumption: this model described a single UAV launch */ 
 
ROOT GCS_Operator:  GCS_Receive_launch_command 
        Check_launch_parameters_for_safety 
    Receive_launch_clearence_from_host_ship 
    GCS_Provide_launch_command 
    /*Receive_UAV_status_and_position */ 
    (   Status_acceptable  
                            Command_UAV_to_proceed_on_ingress | 
                         
        Status_unacceptable  
                            Command_UAV_abort    ); 
 
ROOT Ground_Crew:  Crew_Receive_launch_command 
        Crew_Provide_launch_command; 
 
ROOT UAV:    UAV_Receive_navigation_reference 
        UAV_Receive_launch_command 
        Launch 
       Execute_climb 
        Maneuver_to_clear_obstacles 
        Maneuver_to_ingress_altitude 
        Level_off_at_ingress_altitude 
        Transmit_status_and_position 
 
        ( Receive_command_to_proceed  
                      Follow_flight_path_to_reach_onstation_area_and_altitude  
                          Reach_onstation_waypoint | 
                         
                          Receive_command_to_abort 
          Abort_mission ); 
 
ROOT Environment:       Provide_navigation_reference ; 
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G.3.  IDENTIFYING EVENT COORDINATION 
Now that each actor’s event grammar rule has been modeled, we establish the inter-root coordination.  
Before we do that, however, we can run the model and inspect it for ideas for emergent behaviors that 
might take place without the coordination constraints.  Emergent behaviors are further discussed in the 
next section.  The coordination statements for the Ingress phase are presented below. For example, the 
first COORDINATE block states that the first launch command comes from the JTF C2 actor, and is 
received by the GCS Operator, and that in all scenarios this launch command must be provided prior to 
it being received. 
COORDINATE  $a: JTF_Provide_launch_command  FROM JTF_C2, 
  $b: GCS_Receive_launch_command  FROM GCS_Operator 
 DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD; 
 
COORDINATE  $a: Provide_navigation_reference  FROM Environment, 
  $b: UAV_Receive_navigation_reference FROM UAV 
 DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD; 
 
COORDINATE  $a: GCS_Provide_launch_command  FROM GCS_Operator, 
  $b: Crew_Receive_launch_command  FROM Ground_Crew 
 DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;  
 
COORDINATE  $a: Crew_Provide_launch_command  FROM Ground_Crew, 
  $b: UAV_Receive_launch_command  FROM UAV 
 DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;  
 
COORDINATE  $a: Transmit_status_and_position        FROM UAV, 
  $b: ( Status_acceptable | Status_unacceptable ) FROM 
GCS_Operator 
 DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD; 
 
COORDINATE  $a: Command_UAV_to_proceed_on_ingress FROM GCS_Operator, 
  $b: Receive_command_to_proceed       FROM UAV 
 DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;  
 
COORDINATE  $a: Command_UAV_abort              FROM GCS_Operator, 
  $b: Receive_command_to_abort        FROM UAV 
 DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;  
Note that one of the COORDINATE statements contains alternate events – this is necessary to denote an 
event in one root that precedes alternate events in another root. 
Figure G.5 illustrates horizontal precedence relations added between two roots as a result of adding the 
first two coordination statements.  A best practice from Appendix D is to add one constraint at a time 
and inspect the results after each addition to ensure the constraint has the intended effect.   
                   
Figure G.5.  The solid horizontal arrow is a precedence relation between roots (in green), a result of the 
first two COORDINATE statements.  
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G.4.  PERFORMING V&V WITH MP BEHAVIOR MODELS 
Having demonstrated the process for extracting MP models from mission narratives, this section focuses 
on the scenario generation-inspection cycle that constitutes behavior model V&V once an MP model 
exists.  In particular, we discuss and demonstrate example instances of verification and validation issues 
that can be found in MP models.   First, we present a general overview of the types of V&V issues that 
develop in behavior models.  Next, we present sample V&V issues in the context of the UAV Ingress 
Phase model.  Finally, we present some MP modeling heuristics and some typical errors to avoid. 
G.4.1.  TYPICAL MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION ISSUES 
    Table G.2 summarizes verification and validation activities that can be conducted using Monterey 
Phoenix models.  System verification is “the confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, 
that specified requirements have been fulfilled” (SEBoK authors, 2016).  In preparation for verification 
and validation, the model undergoes a review for syntax errors, typos, transcription errors, and 
notational errors.  For MP in particular, we must also verify we are running the model at a suitable scope 
for exposing verification errors.  The verification team inspects the event traces at each given scope 
(starting at scope 1) to ensure that the required behaviors are present and that the prohibited behaviors 
are absent. System validation is the procedure used to ensure compliance of any system element with 
its intended purpose (SEBoK authors, 2016).  Using MP, the validation team can inspect the event traces 
for the presence of extra behaviors that were not specified in the requirements, yet are permitted by 
the design nonetheless.  Some of these extra behaviors may be valid and acceptable, in which case these 
behaviors are noted and possibly incorporated into the requirements specification.  Other extra 
behaviors may be invalid and unacceptable, in which case new constraints must be written into the 
model, tested for their effectiveness at removing the unwanted behavior(s), and translated into the 
requirements specification.   
 
Table G.2. Behavior model V&V activities. 
 
Look for and address: e.g., 
Syntax errors missing semicolons, misplaced parentheses 
Typographical and transcription 
errors 
misspelled event names, forgotten_underscores, 
wrong event names used 
Notational errors deviations from required notation and style 
guides adopted by the organization 
Scope errors running only at scope 1 when errors need scope 2 
or 3 to manifest 
Required behaviors that are 
missing 
none of the event traces show a certain behavior 
that was required  
Prohibited behaviors that are 
present 
some event traces show a certain behavior that 
was prohibited 
Unspecified valid behaviors some event traces show wanted behaviors that 
were not explicitly required 
Unspecified invalid behaviors some event traces show unwanted behaviors that 




Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
97 
 
G.4.2.  APPLICATION OF V&V TO BEHAVIOR MODELS 
The MP-Firebird tool, accessed at http://firebird.nps.edu/, is used to perform verification and validation 
(V&V) of behavior models.  The entry page provides an example model and access to MP’s 
documentation (see Appendix D for an overview of the user interface). Figure G.6 shows a snapshot of 
the MP-Firebird interface with the UAV Ingress model loaded, the MP code typed on the left, the graphs 
generated from that code on the right, and the Run button and Scope slider bar on the top left.  In the 
case of the UAV Ingress model, only two event traces are generated and they are the only possible 
outcomes of this model.  These traces (after undergoing verification and validation) are shown in 
following Figures G.7 and G.8.  The subsections that follow illustrate types of V&V errors using the UAV 
Ingress model as an example. 
 
Figure G.6.  The UAV Ingress model loaded and executed at scope 1 in MP-Firebird.  Code is typed or 
loaded on the left, and graphs are generated from that code on the right.  Since there are no loops in 








Figure G.7.  The first event trace shows the Ingress phase ending with the UAV’s arrival at the on station 








Figure G.8.  The second event trace shows the Ingress phase ending with an alternate scenario (mission 
abort).   
 
For this Ingress model, there are only two possible outcomes.  The model will run until the UAS reaches 
the on station waypoint, or it is commanded to abort. 
If we were to expand this model with additional exception cases, we would have a significantly more 
complex model that may demonstrate many more endpoints or even undesirable behavior resulting 
from a deficient behavior specification.  From the size of the simple models depicted above, it should be 
clear that breaking the model up into phases is a helpful practice for keeping this expansion of detail 
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G.4.2.1.  Syntax errors 
The modeler looks for, finds, and corrects syntax errors and typos in real time, after either direct 
inspection of the MP model, or running the model and spotting the impact of a typo in the generated 
traces.  Common example syntax errors are a missing semicolon (Figure G.9) or a misplaced parenthesis 
in the MP code.  
 
Figure G.9.  A snippet of MP code illustrates an example of real-time syntax checking.  In this case, line 
32 is flagged because we start declaring a new root before closing the previous grammar rule with a 
semicolon.  The error is corrected by adding a semicolon after event 
JTF_Provide_launch_command in line 24.   
 
G.4.2.2.  Typographical and transcription errors 
Common typos include misspelled event names, and forgotten underscores in event names resulting in 
two separate events rather than a single, multi-word event.  The real-time syntax checker will flag 
events that are referenced in coordination constraints but were never defined in any grammar rule. 
 
Figure G.10.  A typo in the event name on line 24 (a missing underscore) shows up when we try to 
coordinate the correctly spelled event name on lines 81-83.  If the same error is made in an event that 
does not have coordination, the error will show up in each event trace as two separate events.   
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G.4.2.3.  Notational errors 
Another pre-verification activity ensures the absence of deviations from notation or style guidance, such 
as adhering to a particular language or naming convention.  Suggested conventions for modeling with 
MP are provided in Appendix D, but may vary based on architect or organization preference.  Whatever 
notational conventions are used, be they text-oriented or graphical in nature, they should be established 
and checked prior to verification so that grammatically ambiguous names or stray lines or labels do not 
mask the underlying issues with the correctness of the model according to the requirements.   
G.4.2.4.  Scope errors 
An appropriate scope size needs to be used for verification, as well as for validation.  A model that looks 
error-free at scope 1 may present unintentional or unwanted behavior after iterating a few times at 
scope 2 or 3. We leverage Jackson’s (2006) Small Scope Hypothesis to expose most errors on small 
examples (or small number of loop iterations, in the case of MP). 
In the upper left corner of the MP environment, to the right of the Run button (Figure G.6), we are able 
to specify the scope limit prior to running the model.  This allows the modeler obtain all valid event 
traces within the MP schema up to the specified scope – the upper limit on the number of iterations in 
grammar rules.  Scope must be used with care, as the number of event traces may grow rapidly with 
increasing scope.  In the relatively simple Ingress model, however, we can raise the scope up to two, 
three, four, or even five and receive the same results, since there is no iteration.   
G.4.2.5.  Required behaviors that are missing 
Identification of missing required behaviors is partly cycling on requirement specification clarity, and 
partly checking that all required behaviors in the specification are in fact represented in the model.   The 
mission narrative provided in the DRM in section G.1 served as the requirement specification for the 
Ingress model in MP.  Example questions that came up during the Ingress phase modeling were the 
following: 
 Does GCS operator confirm receipt? 
 Can anyone else give the launch command? 
 Are there situations where [the UAV] wouldn’t climb out? 
 Does there need to be a follow-on command to the ship to prepare/maneuver to receive the 
UAV (similar to ship [maneuver] to achieve launch parameters?) 
In this project, the students had the opportunity to revise the mission narrative opportunity to reflect 
the answers to these and other questions (like those shown in Figure G.4) to ensure the most complete 
description of required behaviors.   
The MP model was constructed following the process described in section G.2 and G.3, and then run to 
verify the presence of all required behaviors.  Early on, a student noticed that one of the required 
behaviors was missing; in fact, an entire scenario outcome was missing, despite the presence of all 
required behaviors in the model.  The cause was a coordination constraint that was forcing the selection 
of one of the outcomes in all scenarios.  In particular, an event that always occurs in one root was 
coordinated with an event that has alternative events in another root, causing the coordinated 
alternative to be selected in each and every scenario (Figure G.11).  This common error is corrected by 








Figure G.11.  An event that always occurs in one root (GCS_Operator) is coordinated with an event that 
has alternative events in another root (UAV).  This is a common anti-pattern that results in the 
suppression of the alternate events (mission abort), since the coordination requires these events to 
occur as a pair in every scenario.  
 
 
Figure G.12.  To correct the issue in the model in Figure G.14, corresponding branches of coordinated 


















Interim Technical Report September 2017 Task Order 0076, RT 176 
103 
 
G.4.2.6.  Prohibited behaviors that are present 
Requirement specifications predominantly describe valid, desired behaviors or characteristics that the 
system under design is to have. Until now, it has been extremely difficult to conduct early V&V for so-
called “negative requirements,” or those that are phrased like “The system shall NOT…”.  Browsing 
dozens or hundreds of event traces may be time consuming and error prone. The larger a behavior 
becomes, the more automated inspection tools become necessary for verifying for the absence of 
known unwanted behaviors.  With MP, we can check a model for the presence of behaviors using 
assertion checking, where one or more behaviors of interest are formally posed as a statement and 
checked against the set of generated scenarios.  The CHECK construct makes it possible to use 
automated trace monitoring. If the property (a Boolean expression in the CHECK) is not satisfied, the 
trace will be marked and available for further inspection.  
For our UAV Ingress model example, imagine that our customer wants us to verify that there are no 
scenarios where the UAV is launched without permission from the JTF C2.  With only two event traces, it 
is easy enough to determine that there are no scenarios in which the UAV is launched without the JTF C2 
having issued a launch command.  If this model were larger, with more UAVs and more scenario 
variants, it may make sense to use a CHECK construct to automate the search for any such scenario that 
violates the customer’s expectation.   
 
CHECK  #Launch                    FROM UAV     <=  
  #JTF_Provide_launch_command      FROM JTF_C2  
   ONFAIL SAY("Unauthorized Launch"); 
 
The above CHECK construct looks at every event trace in the generated set to check that the number of 
launch events does not exceed the number of JTF C2 commands to launch. Each event trace that fails 
this check is automatically stamped with an annotation “Unauthorized Launch,” which draws the 
inspection team to look closely at the annotated subset for errors.  After the CHECK command is used to 
find and fix the errors behavior model, the statement can be converted into an ENSURE statement, 
which is a formally specified requirement. 
 
ENSURE  #Launch                   FROM UAV     <=  
  #JTF_Provide_launch_command     FROM JTF_C2;  
 
Using these statements to detect unauthorized launch makes the assumption that the JTF issues a 
distinct launch command each time a UAV is launched.  It is possible that one launch command may 
authorize multiple UAVs to launch.  In this case, these constraints would have to be made more precise 
to detect truly unauthorized launches, which will require the modeling of more events involved in the 
launch authorization sequence.  These examples are just to illustrate some simple use cases for CHECK 
and ENSURE.   
Assertion checking with the CHECK clause may be the simplest and most common tool for finding 
counterexamples of traces that violate some property.  Traces violating the CHECK condition may be 
marked and annotated with a message that provides some hint about the cause.  Using assertion 
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G.4.2.7.  Unspecified valid behaviors 
Upon browsing the resulting event traces, the model developer may notice the absence of necessary 
behaviors that are missing from the specification such as in Nelson’s ISS example in (Giammarco & Giles, 
2017) or notice the presence of a number of valid behaviors that were not explicitly specified, but are 
present nonetheless. The latter is often the case for models run at scopes 2 and 3, when the effects of 
sets and iteration manifest as different possible permutations of events.    Since the UAV Ingress model 
does not have iteration, the reader is referred to the Car Race model (in the menu of preloaded 
examples on firebird.nps.edu), which shows hundreds of valid behaviors for this system at scope 3.  The 
number of cars participating in the race (one or more), the number of laps driven by each car, and 
whether or not a car finishes the race are the main variables for which all combinations are tried up to 
the specified scope.   Figure G.13 shows two out of 236 examples of valid scenarios for the Car Race 




Figure G.13.  Two valid scenarios for a car race model.  Top: Two cars race, each drive one lap, and then 
the first one to finish wins.  Bottom: Three cars race, two break, and the third one finishes and wins.  
Many more valid combinations exist; MP is used to generate them all up to the specified scope.    
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The event traces from the car race model illustrate examples of emergent behaviors (defined in 
Appendix D).  We can detect, classify, predict and control emergent behaviors with MP as discussed in 
research product [12] in Appendix A.  Table G.3 provides an example emergent behavior analysis related 
to the car race model. 
Table G.3  Summary of Emergent Behavior Analysis for Car Race Examples 
Example Figure Detection Classification Prediction Control 
Car Race G.16 top Automatic 
and scope-
complete 
with MP  
Weak positive 
emergence 
Two cars race, each 
drive one lap, and 
the first one to 








The only car to 
finish wins the 
race. Not a typical 
case, but it is 
permissible. 
-  
G.4.2.8.  Unspecified invalid behaviors 
Browsing the event traces may result in finding examples of behavior that are unwanted.  For example, 
the car race model showed some unwanted behaviors, such as cars winning before having driven as 
many laps as other cars in the race, and multiple cars winning.  Unwanted scenarios like these are not 
always explicit in the requirements; that is why scenario generation with MP is useful for explicitly and 




/* everybody who finishes drives the same number of laps */  
ENSURE FOREACH DISJ $c1: Car, $c2: Car  
   (#finish FROM $c1 == 1 AND #finish FROM $c2 == 1 ->  
    #drive_lap FROM $c1 == #drive_lap FROM $c2) 
… 
/* there always will be at most one winner */ 
ENSURE #winner <= 1; 
… 
 
After fixing the issue in the MP code, we run the trace generation again, until our expectations are 
satisfied and all behaviors that emerge are valid. 
There did emerge an interesting unwanted behavior in the UAV Ingress model.  The following 
description is an excerpt from (Reese, 2017), a PD21 student term paper analysis of the UAV Ingress 
model for SI4022 System Architecture.  PD21 Student Anthony Constable also contributed to the UAV 
Ingress model. 
An early run of the model showed a scenario where an unanticipated “abort” command 
was issued. Early model simulations [generated] a scenario during which the system 
reported acceptable status and the operator, without provocation, commanded the 
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system to abort the mission. This was flagged as a possible emergent behavior and 
inspired reflection on the conditions which would cause such an incident. We 
rationalized several possible scenarios which could result in this behavior. 
The first such scenario [that could make this a valid scenario] is one in which the GCS 
operator receives an indication from a third party that the system is not in acceptable 
status, despite internal reports to the contrary. It is feasible that an external observer 
detects something wrong with the system, which the system itself has not detected 
either due to limited sensor capability (it can’t detect the type of failure), timing (the 
observer detected the problem before it developed to a level where the system could 
detect it), or other (e.g. sensor failure).  
The second scenario is one in which the system has detected an issue, but needs to alert 
the GCS operator in [an alternate] way. The UAV could execute a maneuver such as a 
wing-wave or other pre-determined flight pattern which would alert the GCS operator 
of an issue... 
The third possible scenario is pure operator error. It is feasible that the GCS operator 
could trigger the abort command by accident. Perhaps the exhausted and delirious pilot 
set his coffee cup down on the big red “ABORT” button. This scenario [causes the model 
developer to have an idea] for a multi-step abort sequence in which the system requires 
secondary validation and confirmation of the abort command; “are you sure you want 
to abort the mission?” 
On inspection of the model, it was determined that the unanticipated abort command 
was a result of a modeling error. The script essentially forced the scenario to occur 
because the abort command was coded as a process step as opposed to a conditional 
action based on the system status. The author re-coded the model to make the abort 
command conditional on a “status unacceptable” notification. Further simulations 
revealed that the system behaved as expected with the revised code, however the 
mission narrative and system model should be revised to include other alert pathways 
for the GCS operator and/or ground crew.  
[Figure G.14] displays model outputs before and after the updates described above. The 
early model output is shown on the left, and the updated model output is shown on the 
right. Note the highlighted areas at top right of the model where the system is now 
interacting with the environment for a navigation reference [an error of omission], and 
at the bottom left of the model where the abort command is now contingent on an 
unacceptable status condition. 
The error detected by the student was a verification error that led to a model correction, but the 
commission of the error in this case also exposed a model validation issue that generated ideas for 
requirements that may be necessary to control the situation, should it occur.  What if the UAV is 
experiencing a malfunction that prevents it from transmitting its status through the normal channels?  
Experience has shown that it is far better to consider such circumstances prior to implementation and 
deployment than to be forced to consider ways to deal with such events as they are unfolding.     
Table G.4 provides an example emergent behavior analysis related to the UAV ingress model analyzed 
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Table G.4  Summary of Emergent Behavior Analysis for Car Race Examples 
Example Figure Detection Classification Prediction Control 
UAV Ingress G.17 left Automatic 
and scope-
complete 
with MP  
Strong positive 
emergence 
The UAV gives the 
appearance of an 
acceptable status, 
but the operator 
commands the 
UAV to abort the 
mission. 
- 
   Strong negative 
emergence 
The UAV’s status is 















Many other examples of unspecified invalid behaviors detected with MP are provided in (Giammarco & 
Giles, 2017) and in research products [12] [13] [14] in Appendix A, along with elaboration on emergent 









Figure G.14. Side-by-side comparison of ingress model before (left) and after (right) updates.  From (Reese, 2017).
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G.4.3.   MP MODELING HEURISTICS 
As model developers gain experience with the basic concepts of MP and start to use it for behavior 
model verification and validation, they should refer to these MP modeling heuristics to improve the 
efficiency of trace generation and avoid some typical MP modeling errors. 
Event trace generation time may be one of the main concerns when using MP tools.  With scope 
increase it may grow rapidly. Generation time depends on several factors. 
 The number and complexity of composite and root events. 
 The number and size of traces generated for each root/composite event (this information is 
available in Firebird’s Console window). 
 The number of composition operations and their place within the MP code. 
 The structure of composition operations (in particular, the nesting within COORDINATE). 
 The ordering of root events in the schema’s code. 
As described in Appendix D, the derivation process is based on the search tree (selection of trace 
segments for assembly top-down and left-to-right). Pruning the search tree as early as possible is the 
main principle for speed-up. Here are some heuristics that may help to reduce the generation time. 
G.4.3.1.  Use scope with caution 
The number of traces (and trace generation time) may increase dramatically with the scope. Start MP 
model’s testing/debugging with scope 1 to detect the initial obvious mistakes, and proceed to the higher 
scopes with caution. In many cases small scope (up to 3) is sufficient to detect/fix most of bugs and to 
verify all event traces within a scope with the CHECK constructs (Small Scope Hypothesis). 
G.4.3.2.  Use composition operations as early as possible 
COORDINATE and SHARE ALL require coordinated threads of events to have the same size. If this 
condition does not hold, the derivation process backtracks one step back and picks up another 
root/composite event segment. When performed early in the derivation, it can prune a significant part 
of the search tree. Each composition operation works as a powerful search tree’s pruning tool. ENSURE 
also acts as a filter, rejecting an assembled trace segment when it violates a context condition 
(assertion). 
For the schema’s trace assembly, root event segments are picked up in the order of root event rule 
appearance in the schema. Place a composition operation in the MP schema code immediately after all 
participating root event rules. 
G.4.3.3.  Use BUILD blocks 
Root and composite event segments are derived before the schema’s trace assembly begins. 
Composition operations placed within BUILD blocks may reduce the number of segments derived for 
composite/root event, and as a result reduce the total search. This is yet another application of the 
general principle: “prune the search as early as possible”. 
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G.4.3.4.  Optimization of COORDINATE operations 
Event thread selection for coordination in COORDINATE or SHARE ALL is time-consuming. If the same 
event thread participates in several coordination operations, it makes sense to merge them. For 
example:  
COORDINATE  $x: a FROM A,   
   $y: b FROM B 
  DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; OD; 
 
COORDINATE  $x: a FROM A,   
   $z: c FROM C 
  DO ADD $x PRECEDES $z; OD;  
These can be merged as: 
COORDINATE  $x: a FROM A,   
   $y: b FROM B,  
   $z: c FROM C 
  DO  ADD  $x PRECEDES $y,  
    $x PRECEDES $z; OD; 
The merge eliminates the repeated processing of the coordination thread for A. Notice that ADD may 
process several relations. 
G.4.3.5.  Beware of asynchronous coordination  
Use asynchronous coordination (event reshuffling with <!> or <!CHAIN>) only when it is necessary for 
capturing the requirements. An example of Publish/Subscribe architecture model in the MP Manual 
section 2.8 uses <!> event reshuffling to try all possible permutations of Register/Unsubscribe pairs. 
Such coordination may cause dramatic increase in the number of generated traces (and the generation 
time), since MP will generate all possible permutations of events to coordinate with other sources. If the 
selected event set has N events, then there are N! possible permutations. Since we expect traces to be 
generated for a reasonably small scope, the size of the selected event set will be also small and, 
correspondingly, the number of permutations also is expected to be modest. 
G.4.3.6.  Coordination and iteration 
Coordination of several event threads requires that the numbers of selected events in each thread are 
equal. If selected threads have different number of events, the coordination fails, the trace under 
derivation is rejected, and the derivation backups and proceeds with the next step.  
The inconsistence between the numbers of events in the coordinated threads may be a typical MP 
coding mistake.  For example, in the following snippet, a valid trace will be produced only once, when 
the number of B is precisely 1. 
ROOT R1: A; 
ROOT R2: (* B *); 
COORDINATE $x: A, $y: B  
   DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; OD; 
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G.4.3.7.  Coordination and alternatives 
Another typical mistake with coordination may appear when the event selected for a coordination 
thread appears as an alternative. Then only traces containing that event will be accepted for 
coordination, but traces that select other alternatives will be rejected. Here is an example. 
ROOT R1: ( A | B | C); 
ROOT R2: D; 
COORDINATE $x: B, $y: D 
   DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; OD; 
Only traces for root R1 containing B will be selected, traces for R1 containing A or C will be rejected 
because root R2 will have only traces with D. The solution for this issue (if we want to coordinate only B 
and D) is to make the coordination conditional on the presence of B. 
ROOT R1: (A | B | C); 
ROOT R2: D; 
IF #B > 0 THEN 
   COORDINATE $x: B, $y: D 
      DO ADD $x PRECEDES $y; OD; 
FI; 
G.4.3.8.  Synchronizing iteration cycles and coordination 
Coordinated events may appear inside iteration as alternatives. There are at least two options for 
coordination. 
Option 1. Coordinate event pairs even without any concern whether they appear in the same cycle of 
iteration or not. The following example illustrates this. Notice that the default event sequence (the 
order of event appearance during the derivation) is used for event selection in coordination threads. 
SCHEMA S1 
ROOT R1: (+ (A | B) C +); 
ROOT R2: (+ (D | E) F +); 
 
COORDINATE $a: A FROM R1, $d: D FROM R2 
   DO  
 ADD $a PRECEDES $d;  
   OD; 
 
COORDINATE $b: B FROM R1, $e: E FROM R2 
   DO  
 ADD $b PRECEDES $e;  
   OD; 
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Option 2. Coordinate event pairs, but only if they appear in the same iteration cycle. If selected 
alternatives within the same cycle cannot be coordinated, this trace is rejected. 
SCHEMA S2 
ROOT R1: (+ (A | B) C +); 
ROOT R2: (+ (D | E) F +); 
 
COORDINATE $a: (A | B) FROM R1, $d: (D | E) FROM R2 
   DO  
 IF $a IS A AND $d IS D OR $a IS B AND $d IS E THEN 
  /*  This pair is selected from the same cycle,  
                 since the default event sequence is used for   
                 coordination threads */ 
  ADD $a PRECEDES $d;  
 ELSE REJECT; /* otherwise reject the trace under derivation */ 
 FI; 
   OD; 
Now the coordination is synchronized with the iteration cycles, as shown on the right of Figure G.15. 
 
             
Figure G.15.  (Left) Coordination of event pairs even without any concern as to whether they appear in 
the same cycle of iteration or not, and (right) coordination of event pairs only if they appear in the same 
iteration cycle. 
 
 
